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Abstract 
The Phoenix/Phung Hoang Programme, a CIA-launched operation in South Vietnam lasting 
from 1967 to 1975, is a largely misunderstood topic, and no fully comprehensive account 
of its history has yet been produced. Through the use of primary and secondary source 
material, and by engaging with various historical and contemporary viewpoints, this thesis 
provides a contribution to the small yet diverse pool of scholarly debate surrounding the 
programme, paying particularly attention to disputes over effectiveness and ethical 
violations. To achieve this, Phoenix/Phung Hoang’s history is examined from inception to 
conclusion and placed within the context of the broader Vietnam War. Moreover, the goals 
and impact of key figures, such as Richard Nixon, Robert Komer and William E. Colby, will 
be discussed throughout the thesis.  
This study aims to demonstrate that Phoenix/Phung Hoang developed into a highly 
effective counterinsurgency programme, yet ultimately failed following the conclusion of 
American participation in 1972/73. Contrary to the assertions of a number of scholars, the 
programme made great strides, and had by 1971 taken a heavy toll on the communist 
political apparatus in South Vietnam. Furthermore, this study challenges the view that 
Phoenix/Phung Hoang was exceedingly immoral, and contends that most accusations of 
torture, assassination, corruption and mass arrests were inaccurate or exaggerated. Close 
attention is paid to the programme’s role within, and dependence on, the broader Vietnam 
War, primarily regarding its inability to function capably without American support, 
guidance, or personnel. Emphasis is placed on the role of a number of factors relating to 
the broader war in accelerating American disengagement from Phoenix/Phung Hoang, 
such as US anti-war demonstrations, Nixon’s efforts to attain a second term in office, and 
Vietnamisation. Additionally, this thesis explores parallels between the programme’s 
failure in the political conflict, and the US/South Vietnamese failure in the military conflict 
as exemplified by the fall of Saigon. As will be seen, both failures were the result of the 
United States’ departure from Vietnam.  
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Introduction 
The Vietnam War was not one conflict, but rather a confluence of various political, guerrilla 
and conventional military struggles fought at different times across three and a half 
decades. For this reason, it could not be won through any single method of warfare. During 
the most notorious epoch of the Vietnam War, lasting roughly from 1960 to 1975, the ill-
fated nation of South Vietnam attempted to surmount both an internal communist 
insurgency, and the external threat of North Vietnam. This struggle for dominance over the 
South essentially consisted of two wars waged simultaneously: the military war, which 
centred on destroying enemy forces and units, and the village war. The latter was a contest 
for control over South Vietnam’s countryside and the rural peasantry who constituted the 
majority of the country’s population. During this contest, the South Vietnamese 
government, also known as the Government of Vietnam (GVN), and its ally the United 
States attempted to repulse and defeat the internal communist insurgency’s campaign to 
establish authority over the nation’s villages and hamlets. It was not fought via large 
battles, but rather through intelligence, political/economic measures, local-security forces, 
and small units tasked with damaging each side’s administrative infrastructure and 
functionaries. It is during this conflict that the Phoenix/Phung Hoang Programme, one of 
the most effective attempts by the allies to succeed in the village war, would rise and fall.  
The Phoenix/Phung Hoang Programme was an integrated management and advisory 
structure developed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1967 to coordinate 
intelligence and operational assets against the Vietcong Infrastructure (VCI). It was formed 
of two programmes which functioned as one concerted effort, Phung Hoang being a South 
Vietnamese management structure, and Phoenix being the American advisory structure 
attached to Phung Hoang. For the sake of simplicity, Phoenix/Phung Hoang will be 
shortened in most instances to Phoenix, while the term Phung Hoang will only be used 
when referring solely to the Vietnamese aspect of the programme. Before Phoenix can be 
discussed in greater detail, the organisation and purpose of the VCI, the importance of the 
village war, and allied strategy in the village war prior to 1967, must first be addressed. 
The Vietcong Infrastructure, also known as the shadow apparatus or shadow government, 
was the political and military support/command network of the communist insurgency in 
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South Vietnam. It consisted of the leadership and structure of the People’s Revolutionary 
Party (PRP), which was the Southern arm of North Vietnam’s communist Labour Party, and 
the leadership of the National Liberation Front (NLF), which encompassed the Vietcong 
(VC) and was under the direction of the PRP. The structure as a whole, including the PRP, 
came under the authority of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), which 
answered directly to Hanoi. It is through this network that North Vietnam and the southern 
communist leadership directed the insurgency, extended political/military control, and 
commanded guerrilla and conventional forces. 1  The VCI’s members and functionaries, 
known as cadre, operated at the village, district, provincial, regional and national echelons 
of South Vietnam’s geographical hierarchy.2 The cadre assigned to each area, for example 
a village or province, directed all insurgency activity in that area, and were responsible for 
establishing communist authority over that same location. Through imposing taxation, 
implementing local government, creating propaganda, and proselytising civilians, these 
cadre formed the backbone of the shadow government’s campaign to extend its authority 
across South Vietnam, most notably throughout villages and hamlets. The VCI also 
supported the military side of the insurgency: cadre were responsible for digging tunnels, 
recruiting troops, military proselytising, stockpiling rice and other resources, and directing 
units.3 In parts of the country where the VC held the dominant position, hamlet- and 
village-level cadre often lived within the same areas they directed.4 The VCI within each 
village, district, province and region was administered by a party secretary, who answered 
to a party secretary at the echelon above their own; hamlets were administered by a 
village-level secretary. These secretaries oversaw a number of chiefs, each of whom was 
responsible for a different aspect of the insurgency within their administrative area.5 The 
most accurate estimates in 1967 placed the VCI’s size at between 80,000 and 150,000 
                                                                
1 Background paper, ‘The Viet Cong Infrastructure’, June 1970, DPC/2310412004, TTUVVA, URL: 
http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-
bin/starfetch.exe?7Owk4ermcBWMRfH77dpMngg8g5VkNRk8TJ.dLzseapbUwqRfmbY9ocQZThw.x33qNm
tOMx8SQyx2jEKIFAqSxMuNkbgpk2R.@DPx2Bu5Hxo/2310905022.pdf, pp.2-5 
2 Mark Moyar, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA’s Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong (Naval 
Institute Press, 1997), p.11 
3 Letter for the Phung Hoang Committee, MR III, undated (circa late-1972), RG 472/General Records/Box 
33/5642565, NARA/II, p.1 
4 Moyar, Phoenix, p.13 
5 ‘The Viet Cong Infrastructure’, June 1970, 2310412004, TTUVVA, pp.5-7, 15-19 
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personnel, which did not include guerrilla or conventional units because they were a 
separate force from the infrastructure’s members and cadre.6    
Unlike most conventional conflicts, the Vietnam War would ultimately be won or lost at 
the village and hamlet level. In order to ascertain why the village war was so crucial to the 
broader conflict, and by extension why destroying the VCI was of paramount importance, 
village society in South Vietnam must first be understood. The rural peasant populations 
of South Vietnam had little concern for national identity or ideology, and focused solely on 
the prosperity of their village and their families. As such, the loyalty of individual villages 
was guided by self-interest and self-preservation:  
‘[T]the Vietnamese peasant does not change his political allegiance, if in fact 
allegiance was ever given, but rather continually adapts himself to what he perceives 
to be the political realities in his village at the moment’.7 
Villages generally supported and acknowledged the most ubiquitous and commanding 
force in their local area. This was dictated both by self-preservation, and the ideals of 
Confucianism which many peasants followed.8 As a result, control of rural South Vietnam 
necessitated the establishment of a presence within almost every village. The COSVN 
understood these concepts well, as the placement of VCI cadre within hamlets gave the 
appearance of dominance throughout the area, while offering land and low rents further 
enticed villagers to support their cause.9  
The United States and GVN’s struggle to control the countryside was referred to as 
‘pacification’. Pacification efforts, aiming to improve village security and combat the 
shadow government, were attempted in the early-1960s, but these efforts failed to 
comprehend village society. The most notable example was the Strategic Hamlet 
Programme. Between 1962 and 1964, the programme did little more than anger the 
                                                                
6 CIA, ‘The Vietnam Situation: An Analysis and Estimate’, 23 May 1967, LBJ, Papers of the Capital Legal 
Foundation, Box 5/Folder CIA 238, in, Moyar, Phoenix, p.11  
7 Staff report prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 2 February 1970, 
DPC/2390706003, TTUVVA, URL: http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-
bin/starfetch.exe?pNEL.ojrg7ZxMCXCFP0L7Jn4aaD8DPxGWVC05K072OwspntXILVZCz.Z@vdazkw9yKRu6
A8FrHM.fMrPBUW93YXLMaP0F6tmvmjAKD@fJco/2390706003.pdf, p.7 
8 Moyar, Phoenix, p.19-20 
9 Ibid, pp.21-22 
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peasant populations through removing them from their ancestral homes and placing them 
in supposedly well defended hamlets.10 This error in judgement had advocated removing 
the population from the VCI, rather than the other way round. By 1967, the succeeding 
pacification strategy utilised a three-pronged concept (political, economic, security) to 
pacify the pre-existing villages throughout South Vietnam.  
From 1967 to 1975, the Phoenix Programme constituted a major aspect of the security 
element of pacification, tasked with dismantling the shadow government across South 
Vietnam. Meanwhile the political and economic sections of pacification were tasked with 
consolidating GVN authority in the areas freed from Vietcong and VCI control. Phoenix’s 
strategy centred on a joint intelligence/exploitation approach, whereby individual cadre 
were identified, located and then neutralised. The programme had no intelligence or 
operational capabilities of its own, but rather was designed to coordinate the various GVN, 
and some American, agencies and programmes that were already combating the shadow 
government. These counter-VCI assets included military and civilian intelligence agencies, 
the National Police (NP), small counterinsurgency units, psychological operations, 
interrogation centres, and information centres. The GVN management structure was 
tasked with instigating cooperation and coordination between these assets, which would 
allow for the honing of intelligence and operational forces towards identifying and 
neutralising VCI targets with pinpoint accuracy. Although counter-VCI agencies remained 
separate from, and independent of, the Phoenix Programme, they were required to 
participate within it, as well as provide representatives and distribute relevant intelligence. 
The American role within Phoenix was ostensibly advisory, yet in truth advisers not only 
guided and assisted their GVN counterparts, but were in many instances the primary 
influencing force behind the programme’s activities.  
Phoenix remains a heavily disputed topic among scholars, with the bulk of debate 
pertaining to the success and/or morality of the programme. The arguments thus far 
raised, while diverse and often insightful, frequently fail to properly represent the 
programme and its history. Douglas Valentine attempts to portray Phoenix in an 
                                                                
10 Mark Atwood Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History (Oxford University Press, 
2008), p.74 
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overwhelmingly negative light, asserting that it aimed at ‘terrorizing’ the Vietnamese 
population into accepting GVN authority.11 This view is echoed by Alfred McCoy, who 
states that the programme was a ‘murderous covert operation’ with ‘limitless funding and 
unrestrained power’. 12  McCoy and Valentine also claim that Phoenix was ineffective, 
arguing that it mostly failed in its efforts and did not severely damage the VCI.13 The case 
for Phoenix being a murder/terror campaign is predominately upheld both by hearings in 
the US during the early-1970s, which saw the programme’s activities come under ethical 
scrutiny, and by interviews with former advisers. However, the accusations against Phoenix 
during these hearings, as well as the testimonies of a number of advisers, were often 
exaggerated, particularly in regards to allegations of corruption, torture, mass arrests and 
assassinations. Additionally, interviewees who condemned Phoenix did not represent a 
universal opinion, as numerous former advisers defended the programme’s actions. It 
should also be noted that McCoy’s statements regarding the funding, power and secrecy 
of Phoenix are largely false. The programme did enjoy significant influence and financial 
support at one time, but this was not unlimited, ubiquitous or consistent during its history. 
Furthermore, Phoenix was surprisingly overt: while most of its operations were classified, 
the programme was for much of its lifetime publicly endorsed in South Vietnam by the 
GVN.  
Scholars such as Mark Moyar contest the ethical allegations against Phoenix, highlighting 
that they were commonly unfounded or inaccurate. Gerald Degroot has also questioned 
the validity of these allegations, stating that they were often exaggerated through 
‘sensationalist rumour’.14  However, while Moyar defends Phoenix from a moral stand 
point, he is less inclined to do so in regards to its effectiveness. He suggests that 
counterinsurgency and counter-VCI activity did devastate the VCI, but Phoenix was not 
responsible, instead crediting these achievements to territorial forces such as Regional 
Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF), and some of the programme’s participants such as the 
Provincial Recognisance Units (PRU) and Chieu Hoi Programme. According to Moyar, 
                                                                
11 Douglas Valentine, The Phoenix Program, (iUniverse, 2000), p.13 
12 Alfred McCoy, A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror (Owl 
Books, 2006), p.64 
13 Ibid, p.199, see also: Valentine, Phoenix, pp.203-204 
14 Gerald J. DeGroot, A Noble Cause?: American and the Vietnam War (Longman, 2000), p.217 
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because Phoenix ‘merely attempted to coordinate intelligence sharing and encourage 
existing entities to neutralize the Viet Cong cadres’, it ‘could not possibly have damaged 
the shadow government to any great extent’.15 However, this view underestimates the 
influence of American advisers and officials, neglects the impact Phoenix had on improving 
its participants, and fails to acknowledge the programme’s usefulness as a tool to drive the 
nationwide counter-VCI effort. American advisers were able to not only guide, and often 
direct, their Vietnamese counterparts, but were also effective at identifying faults in both 
the programme and its participating agencies. Furthermore, the successes of many of these 
participants were largely the result of the programme’s ability to build rapports, instigate 
training programmes, distribute intelligence and orchestrate operations. The PRUs, which 
Moyar praises above Phoenix, were most successful during the Phoenix era: their counter-
VCI skills were enhanced and honed after joining Phoenix, their commanders attended 
Phoenix training centres, and many of their greatest successes came during campaigns or 
operations instigated by Phoenix or its advisers.  
Dale Andradé offers a relatively accurate interpretation of the programme’s achievements, 
although his book on the subject is now somewhat outdated, having been published in 
1990. According to Andradé, Phoenix was ‘taking a real toll on the VCI’ by the early-1970s, 
but ultimately failed as a result of the pull-out of American advisory support during 1972.16 
He also argues, similarly to Moyar and DeGroot, that many of the accusations against 
Phoenix, particularly those relating to assassinations, were unsubstantiated. 17  Other 
proponents of the position that Phoenix was effective include Mark Atwood Lawrence, 
stating that the programme ‘damaged the communist political network in many areas’, and 
Marilyn Young, who argues that its activities were impactful, yet cruel and corrupt.18  
John Prados agrees with the view that American advisors were crucial, but is ultimately 
sceptical about Phoenix’s effectiveness. He states that the programme failed to neutralise 
the ‘senior levels of the VC leadership’, highlighting that only ‘some 12.9 percent [of 
                                                                
15 Moyar, Phoenix, pp.XVI, 93-102, 246-248 
16 Dale Andradé, Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War (Lexington Books, 1990), p.229 
17 Ibid, p.212 
18 Lawrence, The Vietnam War, p.133, see also: Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990 (Harper 
Perennial, 1991), pp.212-213 
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neutralised cadre in 1968] were classed as district-level or higher’. 19  This approach is 
erroneous, however, as a number of factors have not been taken into account. First, this 
percentage did not, as Prados goes on to say, decline in 1970 and 1971, but rather 
increased slightly. Second, as Moyar illustrates, the inherent nature of a hierarchical 
organisation (a pyramid structure) dictates that there are ‘far more people at the lower 
levels than at the higher’, and so drawing a negative conclusion from the above percentage 
is illogical.20 Third, defeating the shadow apparatus did not necessitate destroying the 
higher echelons, as neutralising numerous low-level and a reasonable number of mid-level 
VCI was sufficient to prevent the higher echelons from implementing policies and authority 
at the village and hamlet levels. Furthermore, Prados asserts that counter-VCI activity, and 
by extension Phoeinx, became redundant in 1972, as North Vietnam could from this point 
onwards wage a conventional military war.21 However, as the North Vietnamese armed 
forces, the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), often relied on the VCI when operating in 
South Vietnam, counter-VCI activity continued to be necessary until 1975. Only during the 
final months of the war, when North Vietnam’s final offensives achieved victory in a very 
short space of time, did VCI and counter-VCI activities become irrelevant.  
This study aims to provide a new perspective, one which emphasises Phoenix’s history and 
outcome as having been primarily influenced by the broader Vietnam War. Between 1968 
and early-1972, the programme’s campaign against the shadow government was highly 
impactful, with the VCI being severely impaired, if not debilitated, in many areas 
throughout South Vietnam. During this period, Phoenix demonstrated a timeline of 
progress in cooperation, intelligence collection, operational planning, personnel quality, 
motivation, accuracy, efficiency and targeting abilities, all of which contributed to a gradual 
increase in the programme’s ability to damage the VCI. These successes contributed to the 
overall strides made by pacification, with GVN authority established across large sections 
of the countryside by early-1972. Furthermore, while Phoenix was plagued with numerous 
internal issues and setbacks, many were gradually ameliorated over the course of its 
lifespan. It is also the goal of this study to reinforce and build upon the view that many of 
                                                                
19 John Prados, The Hidden History of the Vietnam War (Ivan R. Dee Inc., 1995), pp.213,219 
20 Moyar, Phoenix, p.252  
21 Prados, Hidden History, p.220 
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the allegations against Phoenix were unsubstantiated, which will primarily be discussed in 
Chapter Five. 
In spite of its numerous successes, the inherent flaw of Phoenix, a flaw which was never 
resolved, was its dependence on American financial, military, logistical and advisory 
support. As a consequence, the progress of Phoenix was subject to the broader Vietnam 
War, particularly in regards the political situation within the United States. Until 1968, 
counter-VCI activity achieved very little, as American and Vietnamese officials displayed 
disinterest towards the political side of the war. This changed following the Tet Offensive, 
as the political and strategic ramifications of the nationwide assault resulted in a 
considerable expansion of GVN and American support for Phoenix, particularly as the 
programme became a tool of Vietnamisation. However, the political aftermath of Tet 
proved to be the instigating force behind both the rise and fall of Phoenix, as this had also 
sparked the beginning of United States’ gradual withdrawal from the Vietnam War, which 
included the departure of America from pacification during 1972/1973. This departure 
subsequently saw counter-VCI activity suffer from stagnation and decline, which persisted 
until the fall of Saigon. Furthermore, the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, 
which took place between 1969 and 1974, left pacification efforts exposed to assaults by 
large communist forces, as South Vietnamese forces proved incapable of defending the 
nation single-handedly. As a result of the withdrawal of US support, the Phoenix 
Programme, while highly effective, failed to completely dismantle the shadow apparatus. 
This was a key factor in why the allies did not achieve victory in the village war. However, 
even had the village war been won, the military side of the conflict was equally vital to 
South Vietnam’s survival, and with Saigon’s defeat in 1975 at the hands of the PAVN, it is 
clear that the allies had not achieved victory in either aspects of the Vietnam War.  
The structure of this thesis is predominately chronological. Chapter One discusses counter-
VCI activity prior to ICEX and the programme’s establishment in 1967. Chapter Two focuses 
on 1968 and early-1969, particularly the Tet Offensive and its impact. Chapter Three 
highlights the expansion of, and improvements to, the programme during 1969. Chapter 
Four addresses the programme’s effectiveness against the VCI during 1970 and early-1971, 
particularly during the Cambodian Campaign. Chapter Five evaluates the extent to which 
Phoenix had been successful by 1971, as well as the morality debate around accusations of 
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unethical activity brought against Phoenix throughout its lifespan. Chapter Six looks at the 
decline of Phoenix during and after the departure of American participation in the period 
1972 to April 1975. Finally, the conclusion will measure the overall successes and 
limitations of the programme, illustrating how and why Phoenix/Phung Hoang failed to 
dismantle the VCI entirely, but also that this failure was one facet of why the allies were 
defeated in the Vietnam War.  
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Chapter One 
From Shotgun to Rifle: The Rise of Phoenix 
Prior to 1965, efforts to combat the VCI were sparse and frequently fruitless. Moreover, 
whenever attempts were made to implement pacification or counterinsurgency in an area, 
communist forces often assaulted the location, quashing any progress made by GVN or 
American programmes.1 The military environment had to favour pacification for these 
programmes to survive, yet VC forces held the dominant military position in rural South 
Vietnam. This changed following massive US troop deployments in 1965, as the VC lost the 
strategic initiative and were placed on the back foot militarily. Subsequently, communist 
forces were less able to assault pacification activities, and so combating the VCI on a 
nationwide scale became viable.  
By 1967, a number of agencies and programmes were combating the VCI. The Provincial 
Reconnaissance Units (PRU), a CIA-directed/funded Vietnamese force tasked with rooting 
out the VCI, functioned in small yet well trained squads of 15-20 men. PRUs were well paid, 
tenacious, had the advantage of operating in their home provinces, and utilised their own 
‘networks of informers in all parts of the province’.2 VCI cadre were also captured or killed 
by the United States military, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), local militias and 
GVN agencies such as the National Police (NP), Police Special Branch (PSB) and the Military 
Security Service (MSS). Additionally, VCI and VC were enticed to rally (defect) to the GVN 
through the Chieu Hoi Programme. 3   In early-1967, a CIA officer named Robert Wall, 
inspired by similar and effective British tactics against communist insurgents during the 
Malayan Emergency, created the District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centres 
(DIOCCs).4 These centres and their provincial equivalent, PIOCCs, were designed to ‘break 
down the mutual jealousies and poor coordination practices of the [South] Vietnamese 
                                                                
1 Moyar, Phoenix, p.8 
2 James W. Trullinger, Village at War: An Account of the Conflict in Vietnam (Stanford University Press, 
1994), p.173, see also: Memorandum for the 303 Committee, 11 December 1969, FRUS; Vietnam, 1969-
1976, Volume VI, (Washington, 2006), pp.510-513 
3 L .Wade Lathran to Robert W. Komer, ‘Action Program for the attack on VC Infrastructure’, undated (circa 
21 July 1967), RG 286/Subject Files/Box 64/7353633, NARA/II, tab 11, hereafter cited as Lathran/Komer 
4 Moyar, Phoenix, p.51 
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agencies’. 5  Cooperation was poor between South Vietnam’s police, armed forces and 
agencies, which often competed with one another for recognition and funding. To achieve 
cooperation, these centres were tasked with collecting, collating and disseminating 
intelligence acquired by the various participating agencies and programmes within their 
respective districts/provinces, each of which provided a representative to the centre. Each 
centre was operated by Vietnamese staff, led by a Vietnamese chief, and housed American 
advisers tasked with instigating cooperation.  
While DIOCCs improved cooperation, no nation-wide coordination and management 
structure yet existed. This was due to American and Vietnamese officials having little 
interest in pacification, particularly General William Westmoreland, commander of Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Westmoreland was apathetic towards the political 
conflict, and while advocating an increased effort for the ‘other war’, maintained a Two-
War Concept.6 He asserted that the military aspect of the war had to be won before the 
political ‘termites’ could be eradicated. Conversely, Dale Andradé argues that the exact 
opposite method, destroying the political structure first, would have been more logical.7 
However, only by waging both conventional and political warfare simultaneously could 
Hanoi and the VC be forced into capitulation, as communist military forces defended the 
political infrastructure while the infrastructure supplied and directed these forces.8  
On 9 May 1967, pacification was re-invigorated through President Lyndon Baines Johnson’s 
issuing of Security Action Memorandum No. 362. This directed that all American civilian 
and military responsibilities for pacification be melded into a ‘single manager concept’, 
titled Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS).9 Westmoreland 
was given command of CORDS, but his disinterest towards pacification led him to devolve 
authority to Robert Komer, a ferociously efficient member of the CIA, who assumed the 
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 12 
 
role of ‘Deputy for Pacification’.10 Alfred McCoy argues that Phoenix utilised a ‘labyrinthine 
bureaucracy’ to cloak a supposed murder campaign, but this is contradictory to the nature 
of Komer, the programme’s architect, who held a ‘disdain for bureaucracy’.11 In Komer’s 
eyes, ‘the GVN’s [pacification] efforts represented a “Vast mélange of relatively low-grade 
assets, reporting to a number of different Saigon ministries, largely independent, and with 
no sense of common purpose”’.12 One of his first goals was to establish a management 
structure for counter-VCI agencies and programmes. Assisted by another CIA officer, Evan 
J. Parker Jr., Komer set out to establish a unified intelligence and exploitation system, in 
which intelligence collation was paired with rapid-reaction counterinsurgency units.13  
The new strategy, as Komer described, would be ‘analogous to a “rifle shot” rather than a 
“shotgun”’, whereby intelligence was honed to identify individuals or small groups of 
cadre, who would then be neutralised by local reaction forces. This approach, known as 
‘specific targeting’, contrasted greatly with the customary tactic of sweeping ‘cordon and 
search operations’ where entire villages were searched.14 In order to launch precise strikes, 
specific targeting necessitated the opening of dossiers on identified cadre, containing their 
details and role within the VCI. Once sufficient intelligence/evidence on the exact location 
and illegal activities of the cadre was compiled, the target(s) would be neutralised by small 
reaction forces, such as PRUs or NP units. However, intelligence that was only useful for a 
short period of time (perishable intelligence), such as informants revealing a cadre’s exact 
location at that very moment, would ideally be disseminated and exploited immediately, 
rather than added to a dossier.15 While pitching the concept to Westmoreland and the 
American ambassador to South Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, Komer stressed that the US 
would act in an ‘energizing and advisory role’, while the GVN would provide the bulk of the 
manpower:16  
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‘While the agencies and personnel concerned must be predominantly Vietnamese, 
US personnel must play the vital catalytic role…By using existing OSA and MI 
personnel, added US personnel requirements can be held to a bare minimum of 
around 164…’17 
As this statement highlights, the proposed structure would be GVN operated, but guided 
by an American advisory network extending down to the district level, and occasionally 
lower. The GVN command apparatus was already complemented by teams of American 
advisers, led by either a District Senior Adviser (DSA), Province Senior Adviser (PSA), or 
Corps/Regional Senior Adviser (CSA/RSA). Komer’s proposed structure, titled Intelligence 
Collection and Exploitation (ICEX), would place an ICEX adviser in each advisory team, 
tasked with coordinating and directing their GVN counterparts towards combating the VCI. 
Additionally during his pitch, Komer, interestingly, placed the term ‘”advisor”’ in quotation 
marks, implying that ICEX advisers were envisioned to instruct rather than advise.18  
ICEX was formally approved on 9 July 1967 by MACV Directive 381-41, with funding for the 
programme provided through American channels, and Evan Parker Jr. named as its 
director. ICEX staff now set out to rapidly establish the programme’s ‘skeletal’ structure, 
and discussions were initiated with the GVN regarding their eventual participation. 19 
Committees were established at every echelon to improve communication and intelligence 
sharing between US and GVN agencies/programmes.20 Provincial Interrogation Centres, 
which extracted ‘perishable operational information’ from captured/arrested communists, 
were instructed to disseminate all VCI related intelligence to PIOCCs and DIOCCs. The 
recipient PIOCC or DIOCC would then forward exploitable information to reaction forces to 
launch neutralisation operations.21 PRUs were attached to each DIOCC as a rapid response 
force, and their training further focussed towards combatting the VCI. In addition to pre-
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existing civilian advisers, 40 American military personnel were provided to ‘augment’ this 
training to hone the PRUs’ counter-VCI skills.22 A grading system of preferred means by 
which to neutralise VCI cadre was established, and organised as follows from most to least 
ideal: ‘Defection in place, inducement to rally, capture, destruction of infrastructure 
elements [killing cadre]’.23 This illustrates that the death of VCI cadre or suspected cadre 
would be the result of circumstance, not preference.  
American and GVN officials would measure ICEX’s progress through neutralisation 
statistics. All neutralised VCI cadre would be tallied and reported, the total number of 
which within each district/province/region had to meet that area’s monthly neutralisation 
quota. Quotas were implemented to motivate GVN personnel towards neutralising VCI, 
but were inherently flawed.24 This is because neutralisation quotas equated to a numerical 
evaluation of success, yet the programme was also expected to prioritise neutralising high-
level/leadership cadre. This created a paradox: quotas demanded that X amount of cadre 
be neutralised on a monthly basis, yet the programme could be criticised for failing to 
neutralise many high-level cadre. As considerable effort and manpower is required to 
identify, locate and neutralise a high-level cadre, and as far less effort is required to 
neutralise village- and hamlet-level cadre, advisers and their GVN counterparts would 
often be forced to either meet the monthly quota and fail to neutralise enough high-level 
cadre, or target high-level cadre and fail to fill the quota. This was made more problematic 
because destabilising the shadow government would necessitate weakening both the 
lower echelons, and commanding level authority. This is because the VCI was ‘a highly 
decentralised political movement’, and so two factors were needed to defeat it: the 
removal of commanding level authority, which disseminated the COSVN’s policies to lower 
echelons; and the neutralisation of large portions of the lower echelon’s manpower, which 
facilitated and implemented these policies.25  Furthermore, as will be discussed during 
chapter four, impairing the commanding level authority did not require numerous high-
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level neutralisations, as destruction of the mid-level infrastructure was enough to sever 
the link between VCI leadership and low-level cadre. Therefore, unrealistic demands for 
both high-level and low-level neutralisations created a situation where personnel would 
only focus on one or the other, as meeting at least one of these goals was preferable to 
spreading resources across both and thus risk attaining neither.  
Throughout mid/late-1967, ICEX’s foundation was laid rapidly: It had been positioned as a 
major programme within CORDS’ hierarchy, the small number of DIOCCS in operation had 
been placed within the programme, and some successful PRU operations against VCI were 
being launched.26 By November, Komer was pleased with his staff’s productiveness and 
the speed at which the advisory structure had been constructed. However, he also made 
clear via circulated message that the programme would have to focus on military 
intelligence as well as VCI intelligence.27 This declaration, in conjunction with each district 
ICEX operation being allocated little funding outside of pre-existing district funds, conveys 
the continued imbalance of priority given by US officials to the military side of the War over 
the political side.28  
Disinterest in ICEX was equally displayed by the GVN. ICEX advisers had by August identified 
that the GVN judicial system for captured VCI, an tri, was slow, overcrowded, and often 
released suspects in order to shorten queues.29 Additionally it was discovered in late-1967 
that district chiefs, the GVN officials commanding DIOCCs, often devolved this authority to 
the district S-2 (Vietnamese military intelligence) officer. This frequently hampered 
DIOCCs, as South Vietnamese military officers rarely cooperated with civilian or police 
personnel.30 It was also noted during this period that the National Police Field Force (NPFF), 
a former police security force that was being sluggishly reformed into a counter-VCI unit, 
required ‘proper traininh[sic], quick reaction and good coordination between units being 
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used’, which could only be made possible with high-level GVN backing. 31  In spite of 
American advisers raising these issues, Vietnamese officials prioritised the communist 
military threat far above overhauling their counter-VCI capabilities. This was demonstrated 
in a statement by Randolph Berkeley, a former military intelligence officer: 
‘Vietnamese officials in 1967 paid polite attention to the arguments for Phung 
Hoang [ICEX], but in truth I think they really believed that the only serious problem 
their country faced was the NVA’.32 
Some progress was made in December 1967, when Prime Minister Nguyễn Văn Lộc 
decreed that all Vietnamese counter-VCI agencies and programmes be integrated into a 
single coordinating/management structure named Phung Hoang. 33  Shortly after the 
decree, for reasons still debated, ICEX was renamed Phoenix. The committee structure 
within Phoenix was dismantled, and a similar organisation of committees began to be 
established within Phung Hoang. Phoenix now constituted the American advisory 
structure, which was attached to the Phung Hoang management structure at every 
operating echelon, thereby establishing the US advisory backbone for South Vietnam’s 
counter-VCI activity; this was the structure envisioned by Komer. Phoenix/Phung Hoang 
had been born. However, no real GVN backing was given to this formal decree, and in 
conjunction with negligible financial, manpower, logistical and verbal support from the US, 
the programme remained half-baked. This was particularly noticeable in December 1967 
when manpower shortages led to fourteen Assistant District DIOCC Advisers being 
reassigned as District DIOCC Advisers in other districts.34 Furthermore, deficient resources, 
training and intelligence hindered specific targeting capabilities, and so most operations 
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were geared towards entire villages.35 Moreover, the military environment was still not 
ideal for Phoenix in many areas, as the programme’s small, lightly armed reaction forces 
were frequently forced to avoid areas occupied by large VC units.36 At the dawn of 1968, 
the Phoenix Programme was established and functional, yet lacked national support from 
the US or GVN. Thus, success was limited and progress stagnant. However, the events 
which unfolded in 1968 would reverse this lack of patronage and prove to be the key 
instigating force behind the programme’s future achievements.   
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Chapter Two 
Changing Approaches: The Tet Offensive and its Impact 
Between the 30 and 31 January 1968, South Vietnam erupted in a nationwide military 
conflict which saw the vast majority of its urban centres under attack. The Vietcong and 
PAVN had launched their largest offensive of the war thus far, with tens of thousands of 
regular and guerrilla forces pouring into Saigon, provincial capitals, district towns, and the 
rural countryside. The offensive had been initiated during the lunar new year holiday, Tet, 
a time which traditionally observed ceasefires between both sides. Anticipating that a 
limited ceasefire would once again occur until the holiday’s conclusion, the massive assault 
launched by communist forces had caught American and South Vietnamese units largely 
off-guard. This massive assault, persisting until September 1968, came to be known as the 
Tet Offensive. During the cataclysmic period, which would soon usher in a myriad of 
changes for Phoenix, VCI activity exploded across rural and urban South Vietnam: 
hidden/covert cadre rose up within hamlets to establish local governments; advancing 
communist forces were fed, housed, treated and provided geographical guidance by the 
VCI; and propaganda, proselytising and recruitment cadre began inciting uprisings and 
increasing troop recruitment.  
One short-term casualty of the Tet Offensive was Phoenix, as lightly defended pacification 
efforts across the country were quickly devastated by advancing communist forces. 
Notable examples occurred in Hau Nghia Province, where the Cu Chi District DIOCC was 
destroyed in February and the province’s Phoenix Adviser was killed in April.1 Mark Atwood 
Lawrence correctly states that the shadow government ‘extended its control in the rural 
areas and crippled pacification efforts’.2 Counter-VCI activity was debilitated during the 
offensive’s opening months, which Komer attributed to both the need for Phoenix’s 
facilities to focus on tactical intelligence rather than VCI intelligence, and the consistent 
battering of the programme’s small reaction units and facilities by the communist 
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onslaught.3 While operating well in some circumstances during Tet, including DIOCCs being 
the only active source of tactical intelligence in some areas, the programme was overall 
significantly impaired. 4  Even when intelligence on VCI identities and locations was 
available, launching operations to neutralise cadre proved difficult during Tet, as Phoenix’s 
small reaction units were likely to encounter overwhelming communist forces. Only with 
the military initiative once again favouring the allies could reaction units function 
effectively. 
While the Tet Offensive’s opening months left Phoenix incapacitated, the policy changes 
brought about by this onslaught soon became the catalyst for the programme’s rise to 
prominence and future successes.  Although a resounding tactical victory for the ARVN and 
US military, having repulsed all but a few of the major VC/PAVN incursions within weeks of 
their initiation, the offensive was ultimately a major strategic defeat for the US. Tet 
revealed to the American public the true strength of the Vietcong, critically contradicting 
Johnson and Westmoreland’s avowal that the war was nearing a favourable conclusion. 
Furthermore, the scale, organisation, and ferocity of the offensive had led many of 
Johnson’s advisers to deduce that victory in Vietnam would require greatly increased 
American funding and manpower, thus posing the question of whether to escalate the war 
further, or enter into negotiations with Hanoi.5 Johnson chose the latter, announcing on 
31 March that the United States would seek peace in Vietnam through negotiation, 
additionally declaring the gradual de-escalation of American involvement. American policy 
towards Vietnam consequently shifted from attaining outright victory to attaining limited 
victory through negotiation, followed by eventual American withdrawal.6 This transition in 
approach towards the war constituted the ‘first steps of…Vietnamisation’, and would prove 
to be the impetus for both Phoenix’s rise and fall.7  
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Controlling the rural countryside was paramount to any future negotiations, as the side 
with the most extensive and legitimate authority over South Vietnam’s population, would 
garner an inherently stronger negotiating position. Bunker explained to Johnson in March 
that Hanoi was now preparing for a ‘long war’, whereby the extension of control over South 
Vietnam through a protracted political conflict, would provide the North and COSVN with 
‘a strong posture for negotiations’.8 Bunker recommended ‘an expansion of the Phoenix 
Program’ as one of several means to counter Hanoi’s political ambitions and expand GVN 
authority across South Vietnam, as removing the VCI from the countryside was an integral 
aspect of this process.9 Subsequently, American support and funding for Phoenix began to 
increase exponentially, with more emphasis now placed on the village war, as the 
importance of counter-VCI activity became better understood by US officials. Furthermore, 
Tet resulted in General Creighton Abrams, a more avid supporter of pacification than his 
predecessor, replacing Westmoreland as Commander of MACV on 10 June 1968.10 
The Tet Offensive also impacted GVN officials, particularly President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, 
who had until 1968 displayed little interest for pacification. Tet illuminated to Thiệu the 
fragility of his hold over the rural population, prompting him to throw support behind the 
previously neglected pacification effort.11 This realisation, in conjunction with lobbying by 
Komer and his deputy, William E. Colby; culminated in Thiệu’s issuing of a decree on 1 July 
1968, directing that all civilian and military counter-VCI agencies/activities be unified under 
one structure.12 The decree gave effectual presidential backing to Nguyễn Văn Lộc’s 1967 
decree establishing Phung Hoang. Vietnamese agencies, officials, and staff were now 
directed to participate fully within the programme, and were subsequently more inclined 
to cooperate with, and adhere to, American advisers, although dis-interest and 
stubbornness still persisted in many areas and throughout all levels of the GVN command 
structure. 
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Tet further improved Phoenix’s prospects through the monumental casualties sustained by 
the VC and PAVN. This had severely diminished the COSVN’s pool of manpower, 
consequently diminishing their ability to defend VCI cadre or obstruct pacification efforts.13 
Additionally, covert VCI cadre masquerading as regular peasants revealed themselves 
during Tet to establish local governments and instigate a general uprising against the GVN; 
this made Phoenix’s task of identifying them somewhat simpler.14 The impact of Tet began 
to bear fruit for Phoenix by mid-1968: the programme was formally ‘restarted’ in July, GVN 
backing began to improve cooperation between Vietnamese agencies, and the Two-War 
Concept slowly developed into a ‘“One-War Concept”’.15  CORDS and MACV now set out 
to accelerate construction of DIOCCs and PIOCCs in every district and province, as well as 
expand the number of American advisers assigned to the programme. As Douglas Valentine 
accurately states, the Tet Offensive had ‘pushed Phoenix into the limelight’.16  
From July onwards, Phoenix and Phung Hoang were overhauled, interlinked and expanded. 
On 21 July, Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) was created/issued jointly by MACV and 
the GVN, establishing the basic structure of Phung Hoang. This included forming 
committees at the national, regional, provincial and city echelons, tasked with directing 
Phung Hoang at their respective levels, while each district would be directed by its 
respective DIOCC and district chief. Each committee consisted of a representative from 
every agency/programme participating in Phung Hoang, an American adviser, and a 
chairman.17 Bunker stated in October that the period July-September 1968 represented 
the ‘coming of age of the attack on the VC infrastructure’, as the programme’s basic 
structure was largely completed during these few months.18 An example of this was Tay 
Ninh Province, as by October, the ‘14 allied intelligence outfits’ which had been operating 
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there a year prior, had been consolidated into a single intelligence and exploitation 
apparatus.19 
Although limited during this period, success in collecting, collating, disseminating and 
exploiting intelligence was becoming more common by late-1968, notably regarding 
People’s Liberation Committees. These committees were implemented to extend the 
COSVN’s political influence and legitimise the ‘People’s Revolutionary Party…under the 
guise of democratic elections’. 20  From October onwards, Thiệu emphasised targeting 
Liberation Committees for neutralisation.21 While specific targeting remained unviable in 
most areas during this period, due to the poor training of Vietnamese personnel, the 
programme was capable of launching operations against these committees in numerous 
provinces. In October alone, 71 Liberation Committee members, 30 of whom were in 
leadership positions, were neutralised.22 October had been the first month where these 
committees were a priority target, demonstrating the programme’s ability to hastily divert 
attention towards specific groups of targets. It is difficult to ascertain what percentage of 
neutralised committeemen resulted from Phoenix’s reaction forces, as many may have 
been neutralised through regular military incursions. However, as these specific 
neutralisations were cited as evidence of the programme’s progress during a CIA 
assessment, it is likely that Phoenix was responsible for the majority.23  
Phoenix’s first true trial came on the 1st November, when the three-month-long 
Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) was launched. APC was an American-Vietnamese 
effort utilising regular, local and pacification forces, launched to take advantage of the 
debilitated VC military situation, and envisioned to improve their negotiation position by 
bringing large sections of the countryside under GVN control.24  William E. Colby, who 
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replaced Komer as Deputy for Pacification in November, had a large role in planning the 
campaign. Allied troops would confront the bulk of enemy forces, displacing and removing 
them from ‘contested’ and/or ‘VC-controlled’ villages and hamlets, while pacification 
operations which followed would consolidate GVN authority. Phoenix was tasked with 
rooting out the VCI within these areas and disseminating VCI-pertinent intelligence to allied 
units, Police and local/regional forces.25  
APC saw allied troops inflict heavy casualties and territorial reductions on communist 
forces, while Phoenix assaulted the VCI on a larger scale than ever before. The campaign 
dramatically increased the number of ralliers (defectors) entering the Chieu Hoi 
Programme, often bringing intelligence related to ‘enemy activities, locations of enemy 
forces, arms and rice caches, and…information on the VCI’.26 This intelligence was regularly 
exploited by Phoenix, one example being a psychological operation launched on 24 
December 1968, which led to an entire village in Binh Dinh Province rallying to the GVN 27  
APC concluded on 31 January 1969, with most observers citing the campaign as a success.28 
Phoenix performed well from a statistical standpoint, as although the programme failed to 
meet its APC quota of 3,000 neutralisations a month, the 7,000 total neutralisations that 
were achieved, equated to almost double the usual monthly target of 1,200.29 Additionally, 
40 percent of the 15,776 VCI neutralised in 1968, and 38 percent of neutralised cadre 
functioning above the village level, were achieved in the last quarter of the year. 30 
However, statistical data for Phoenix was famously inaccurate, with various factors causing 
overestimations and underestimations. Mark Moyar highlights a number of these factors: 
many neutralisations during 1968/early-1969 were the result of conventional military 
engagements, not Phoenix’s operations or reaction forces; PRUs did not always report their 
                                                                
25 Cooper, American Experience: Volume III, p.285, see also: Briefing on Pacification at MACV, in: C.M. 
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neutralisations; and inspectors did not always approach hostile areas to identify cadre 
bodies.31  
Inaccuracies also stemmed from falsified reports and inflated neutralisation numbers. 
Douglas Valentine presents an example of falsified reporting, in which Vietnamese civilians 
killed by an American airstrike were chalked up as neutralised VCI, and Moyar states that 
US and GVN officials ‘failed to detect and reject many of the bogus reports’.32 However, 
phoney neutralisation numbers, while indeed a serious symptom of quotas, were not as 
common as they seem: 30-40 percent of neutralisation reports were rejected by American 
and GVN personnel in 1968 for lack of evidence, indicating care was put into ensuring that 
non-VCI were not added to neutralisation statistics; while Valentine’s example was clearly 
an uncommon occurrence, as airstrikes constituted a miniscule percentage of VCI 
neutralisations. 33  Additionally, Parker explained to Colby in early-1969 that the most 
blatant ‘report padding’ by Vietnamese personnel was being curbed through continued 
pressure at the national level and the removal of corrupt GVN officials, which had already 
decreased the frequency of these violations.34 Nevertheless, report padding, albeit being 
reduced, still constituted a severe threat to statistical accuracy.    
Another source of inaccurate data was the an tri detention system. It included very few 
judicial rights for suspects, who were not permitted a lawyer and could be found guilty of 
being a VCI member by any ‘reasonably’ indicative evidence, including incriminating 
documents, eye witness statements, interrogation statements or intelligence reports.35 
Surprisingly, however, the main shortcoming of an tri was the leniency of both the Province 
Security Committees (PSCs), which sentenced suspected VCI and determined length of 
incarceration, and the rehabilitation system: months could be spent deliberating one 
suspect, innocence was often opted for over guilt when in doubt, and sentencing lengths 
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were absurdly short.36 Regarding sentence lengths, ‘more than half’ of suspected cadre 
who were tried and incarcerated were released within a year, not including VCI that were 
simply set free for insufficient evidence. 37  Additionally, suspects were marked as 
neutralised upon capture/arrest rather than after being sentenced, and although they 
were supposedly removed from neutralisation reports if set free or sentenced to less than 
six months, pressure to fill quotas likely took precedence over adjusting this data. This 
culmination of leniency and inaccuracy made any report on sentenced VCI extensively 
erroneous and rapidly obsolete.  
These factors show that statistical data is a poor method for measuring Phoenix’s impact 
on the VCI. However, there are reliable methods. Andradé, for example, emphasises that 
Phoenix can be assessed through identifying the time and effort Hanoi committed to 
‘denouncing it’, and there is a wealth of information pertaining to this.38 Throughout 1968, 
Hanoi-directed radio stations, notably Liberation Radio on 3 December, instructed 
communist forces to ‘”crush the head of the venomous snake PHOENIX”’. 39  COSVN 
Directive 58, 5 December 1968, emphasised the need for APC to be halted, signifying the 
damage inflicted by the campaign.40 Additionally, the NLF had created two clandestine 
forces in mid-1968 to counter Phoenix, the ‘People’s Security Agency and the Armed 
Security Force’.41  
Evidence of the Phoenix Programme’s achievements is also present in statements by VC 
and PAVN members. Bùi Tín, a former colonel in the PAVN, explained in his memoir that 
‘our side also suffered seriously’ at the hands of Phoenix during late-1968.42 In January 
1969, a VCI proselytiser in Saigon confessed to a friend that the programme’s committees 
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had been so ‘active’ in recent weeks that orchestrating any political activity had become 
extremely arduous. Unaware he was actually speaking to a GVN informant, this cadre 
further added that he was contemplating going into hiding.43   
Additionally, American pacification staff identified a correlation between Phoenix’s activity 
during APC, and an increased number of VCI ralliers through the Chieu Hoi program.44 
Phoenix, a programme which hunted the VCI in even the most remote locations of South 
Vietnam, repeatedly damaged cadre’s morale, highlighted best during this period by 
COSVN Directive 71, 31 January 1969: this attempted to ensure all cadre that, with the 
provision they remain committed, ultimate victory would eventually ensue; it also 
instructed the VCI to ‘step up’ the assault against pacification personnel.45   
APC and the events of 1968 boosted Phoenix internally. Morale had risen among US and 
GVN personnel, and multiple circumstances of ‘cooperation and coordination…, often 
where little or none previously existed’, were now occurring.46 Moreover, 41 PIOCCS, three 
CIOCCs (City centres) and 217 DIOCCs, 173 of which housed American advisers, had been 
established by January 1969.47 It was also noted, during September 1968, that all provinces 
and districts that had performed well had also cited for the level of cooperation between 
the province/district chief and their American advisers, which would prove to be a running 
theme throughout Phoenix’s history.48  
To conclude, political turmoil caused by the Tet Offensive had shifted American and GVN 
policy, ushering in a greater appreciation for the political aspect of the war. American 
desire for de-escalation, the need for a strong position during future negotiations with 
Hanoi, and Thiệu’s determination to re-invigorate GVN authority over the rural 
countryside, resultantly positioned Phoenix as a priority programme. Subsequently, 
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funding, manpower, political backing and resources provided to the programme climbed 
sharply. 179 million piastres (approximately US$2,780,000 today) of US funding was 
expended on Phoenix throughout 1968, the vast majority of which was used to construct 
regional, provincial and district centres.49 The South Vietnamese, owing to the deplorable 
state of their economy, provided little-to-no funding, thus demonstrating the monolithic 
importance of American support. Furthermore, the American advisory effort had been 
crucial in instigating motivation and participation among Vietnamese agencies, further 
highlighting the necessity of American participation within the programme.  
Phoenix’s expansion resulted in significant improvements to cooperation and operational 
capability, which is attested by evidence other than unreliable statistics, such as communist 
documents, statements and directives. However, statistical data can be used on occasion 
to highlight trends: only 2,259 of the 15,776 reported neutralisations in 1968 were 
fatalities.50 As dead VCI were the easiest to fabricate in a report, the smaller percentage of 
VCI that were reported as killed compared to captured or rallied affirms that the 
programme was not the assassination/murder campaign it has been accused of being by 
senators and scholars alike. In addition to cadre losses, communist military casualties 
during Tet and APC were staggering, with the PAVN’s conventional units forced into 
hibernation, thereby leaving the shadow apparatus exposed to intelligence and 
counterinsurgency operations. This military aspect also displays the importance of 
American support, as US troops were fundamental in stabilising the nation to the extent 
needed for pacification programmes to operate effectively. 
While Phoenix saw substantial progress and expansion during 1968, this did not, as Thomas 
Ahern illustrates, ‘persuade agency or CORDS officials that the program was fulfilling its 
potential’.51 Particularly, officials were concerned that only 13 percent of neutralised cadre 
had been above the village level.52 This had, however, been the result of three factors: the 
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programme was still in its infancy; GVN staff still lacked much in terms of motivation, 
training and participation; and specific targeting was not yet a widely implemented 
concept. However, as highlighted in Chapter One, numerous low-level neutralisations 
damaged the COSVN’s ability to implement its policies at the crucial village and hamlet 
echelons. VCI casualties had been substantial, and while these cadre were easily 
replaceable, the pool was not infinite. This is not to say that the programme had no 
shortcomings, as many imperfections persisted: cooperation instigated by American 
advisers was ‘rather the exception than the rule’, military and police officials frequently 
refused to collaborate, Vietnamese centre chiefs and staff were often poorly trained or 
lacked interest for Phoenix, specific targeting was uncommon, corruption was prominent 
in some provinces, and an tri remained sluggish and impractical.53 Furthermore, some 
provinces, notably Hau Nghia, were cited for atrocious GVN participation and operational 
capability.54  
Nevertheless, the Phoenix Programme entered 1969 far more capable to resolve these 
shortcomings than a year prior, owing largely to the impact of the Tet Offensive and 
subsequent events of 1968. However, while Tet gave Phoenix the attention and resources 
needed to now prevail, it had also instigated a policy that would arise during the Nixon 
administration, Vietnamisation, ultimately resulting in the eventual withdrawal of the 
American military forces, advisers, and funding that were crucial to the programme’s 
success and longevity.  
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Chapter Three 
Nixon, Vietnamisation, and the 1969 Pacification Plan 
Richard Milhous Nixon entered the White House on 20 January 1969 on the back of a 
promise to the American people to withdraw from the Vietnam War. The new president 
advocated negotiations with Hanoi, reduced commitment to Vietnam, and a peace that 
would leave America’s image untarnished. A cornerstone policy of the new administration 
was to subsidise gradual American withdrawal by steadily increasing South Vietnamese 
responsibility for the war, whereby American monetary power would be used to expand 
and invigorate the South Vietnamese economic, military and political position. This policy 
came to be known as Vietnamisation. The Phoenix Programme was crucial to 
Vietnamisation, as it aided the policy’s implementation in three respects: GVN territorial 
supremacy was vital not only to ensuring a strong negotiation position, but also for creating 
the appearance of allied victory; pacification was one of the three key means by which to 
facilitate American troop withdrawals, the other two being an expanded air campaign and 
increased financial and material support for the ARVN; and, providing US military forces 
continued to support pacification programmes and defend pacified areas, Phoenix 
operations could damage the Vietcong Infrastructure, which acted as a source of ‘food, 
recruitment, intelligence and concealment’ for the PAVN and VC.1 Consequently, Phoenix 
continued to enjoy extensive support from the US and South Vietnamese governments.   
The 1969 Pacification and Development Plan, designed to consolidate and expand on gains 
made by APC, featured Phoenix as one of its eight priority points.2  The plan had two 
phases, the first lasting from February to June, and the second from July to October. 
Phoenix’s role within the plan included its further augmentation and improvement, as 
shortcomings and potential areas for development were highlighted by a number of 
sources, including National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) One: further emphasis 
needed to be placed on quality over quantity regarding neutralisations; while the 
programme enjoyed support from the Thiệu government, this motivation decayed at the 
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local province and district administrations; most GVN officials and staff lacked training in 
counter-VCI intelligence and operations; ‘Vietnamese manpower shortages’ were 
common; cooperation and coordination too often relied on the relationship between the 
local leaders of various civilian, military and police agencies; and ‘judicial reforms’ for an 
tri were recommended, as the Phoenix Directorate, CORDS, and the South Vietnamese 
Interior Minister, Trần Thiện Khiêm, expressed concern over the system’s inefficiency.3  
During phase one of the 1969 pacification plan, the programme observed several 
developments. On 10 February, US and GVN officials instructed all echelons to ensure 
closer cooperation and coordination between Phoenix intelligence channels and Regional 
Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PFs), as these capable units’ frequent presence within villages 
placed them in a unique position to gather intelligence. 4  RF/PFs were instructed to 
regularly disseminate all relevant VCI intelligence to the local district or province Phoenix 
centre(s), and vice versa. In order to obtain the support of province chiefs for the new 
initiative, American advisers across all agencies and echelons were instructed to coordinate 
placing pressure on the GVN command structure, as Vietnamese staff and chiefs were 
frequently stubborn towards cooperating with other agencies unless compelled to do so 
by their superior officers.5 This resulted in reasonable improvements to cooperation by 
mid-1969, and RF/PFs were by then also assisting in clearing villages of both covert and 
overt VCI.6 
As Vietnamese personnel were generally untrained in counter-VCI activity, Phung Hoang 
Training Schools (PHTS) were established in Military Regions (MR) III and I in December 
1968 and February 1969 respectively, wherein seminars were held on the exact tasks that 
each specific staff member at a Phoenix facility was responsible for. Chiefs and 
commanders of PRUs, RF companies, the NPFF and various other agencies, attended three-
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day seminars; province S-2s, ‘National and Special Police Chiefs, Districts Chiefs, and 
District National Police Cadre’ attended one-week seminars. These schools were entirely 
US-funded during this period. 7  A school specifically for American personnel was also 
established, in Vung Tau City.  
The task of Reforming the an tri system took its first major steps on 21 March, when 
Circular 757 was introduced, establishing a formal classification criteria for VCI cadre. Class 
A VCI were party members or cadre in leadership positions and could be sentenced to a 
minimum of two years, class B VCI were any members of the VCI and could be sentenced 
to between one and two years, and class C were not cadre but assisted the VCI in some 
capacity, and could be sentenced to a year maximum or set free.8 Additionally, monthly 
minutes were to be sent from every PSC to the Phoenix Directorate, reporting on the 
identity and final disposition of all tried suspects. 9  Furthermore, a Phung Hoang 
representative would now sit on every PSC, and it was stressed that these committees 
meet weekly.10  
Regarding the American advisory effort, Theodore Shackley became the CIA station chief 
for Saigon in December 1968, and almost immediately after began pushing for Phoenix’s 
staff requirements to be met by MACV rather than the CIA. Shackley achieved this in June 
1969, when responsibility for manpower, management and support was turned over to 
MACV. The top spot in Phoenix would continue to be held by a CIA official, John H. Mason, 
who replaced Parker as Phoenix’s director in early-1969. This transfer of responsibility was 
an astute move by Shackley, as not only could he now divert his limited CIA staff towards 
other matters, but also because the military was far more capable of providing the 
manpower and intelligence officers needed for Phoenix’s expanding advisory effort. 11 
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MACV also assumed the CIA’s role of managing, and providing advisers to, PRUs in mid-
1969, although the CIA continued to fund these units.12 
Operationally, Phoenix continued to expand its capacity for combating the VCI. Rare but 
increasingly frequent instances of specific targeting were now occurring as a result of 
advancements made in coordination and training, although progress remained slow for the 
first half of 1969. Additionally, collaborative operations between Phoenix and American 
military units became commonplace during 1969. II Field Force Vietnam, the American 
military command responsible for III Corps, expressed a desire in early-1969 for American 
military forces to ‘assist/participate in these PHUNG HOANG operations’. Consequently, 
province advisers from February onwards began identifying cadre and villages for military 
operations. The Deputy for CORDS in MR III, Charles S. Whitehouse, stated in July 1969 that 
‘several successful PHUNG HOANG operations were planned and executed’ as a result of 
this collaboration.13  
The NPFF was an example of a participating agency that had failed to make much progress, 
which was particularly problematic considering its envisioned importance as a counter-VCI 
unit. During May, Colby correctly identified that the NPFF’s failure resulted from it not 
being brought closely enough into Phung Hoang operations and placed pressure on Trần 
Văn Hai, the Director General of the National Police (DGNP), to ‘energize’ Phung Hoang’s 
command chain towards ensuring the agency was wholly involved in the programme. 
Additionally, Colby instructed American advisers to ensure that NPFF participation 
occurred at every echelon.14 By mid-1969, too little time had passed to ascertain whether 
Colby’s initiative had made much of an impact on the NPFF, but it is likely, on account of 
Colby’s significant influence over the GVN, that this contributed to progress made in the 
second half of the year. 
By June 1969, Phoenix activity included Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). These 
operations had three stages: posters denouncing specific cadre as criminals were 
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distributed, urging the public to assist in their arrest; cadre were then made to appear as 
traitors before their compatriots through a number of methods; finally, broadcasts, leaflets 
and other forms of media were honed towards the individual cadre, declaring the 
hopelessness of their situation and threat to their life, ideally then leading to their 
defection through the Chieu Hoi system.15 Leaflet campaigns were particularly potent, as 
between 1969 and 1971 one third of VC and PAVN members who rallied did so with a 
leaflet in their hand. 16  Psychological operations such as this became an increasingly 
effective tool of the Phoenix Programme.  
Phase one of the pacification plan concluded on 30 June, with Colby and a number of 
CORDS officials stating that Phoenix’s progress had been slow and/or poor, notably 
asserting that too many cadre had been neutralised ‘by accident’ rather than being 
identified prior to capture/death/rallying. 17  Conversely, C.M. MacLehose, British 
ambassador to Vietnam, stated that he ‘heard plenty of criticism’ for Phoenix during mid-
1969, but was able to see its ever-growing potential.18 Additionally, CORDS had praised 
Phoenix’s intelligence and exploitation capabilities, and it was stated in NSSM One that 
Phoenix had only recently become a priority programme, and so minimal progress was 
expected for 1969.19 Moreover, the route of Phoenix’s criticism largely stemmed from 
unfair standards: while the programme only obtained 7,262 of its quota of 9000 
neutralisations for phase one, previous chapters have already highlighted the flaws in this 
method of assessment; the judicial system was criticised for slow progress, yet substantial 
improvement attempts had only begun to be implemented months prior; and while it is 
true that ‘considerable US pressure’ was required to obtain results, not only was this the 
case for most American programmes that involved the South Vietnamese, but Phoenix was 
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built on the understanding that American advisory pressure would be crucial for some 
time. 20  Ergo, while various difficulties and shortcomings remained, criticism regarding 
phase one was generally either unfounded or lacked appreciation for the progress made 
relative to the amount of time that Phoenix had been a priority programme.    
Phase two of the 1969 pacification plan observed further developments. Circular 2212, 
designed to improve and expand upon Circular 757, was introduced on 20 August.21 As the 
instructions of 757 were constantly ignored by security committees and arresting units, 
particularly regarding adherence to classification criteria and the continued lack of speedy 
sentencing, 2212 was introduced to streamline the an tri process. Aside from 
demonstrating increased GVN demand for adherence to an tri regulations, 2212 instructed 
that all evidence and investigations pertaining to a suspect be completed and provided to 
the local PSC within thirty days of the suspect’s capture/arrest. Furthermore, to expedite 
the sentencing phase, PSCs were now instructed to convene more than once a week.22 The 
culmination of Circulars 757 and 2212, aided by further emphasis from GVN leadership and 
Phoenix advisers, resulted in noticeable improvements in some regions by September: 
between July and September, the number of suspected VCI cadre awaiting trial in MR III 
dropped from 1,126 to 586, and a slight increase in PSC meetings occurred in some 
provinces.23 However, failure to adhere to regulations persisted in most circumstances: A 
and B class VCI were still receiving sentences shorter than their prescribed minimum; and 
local detention centres in certain provinces, notably Hau Nghia, remained or became so 
crowded that prisoners were forced to sleep on the floor.24  
Efforts during this period to expand the training of American and Vietnamese staff were 
more fruitful than efforts to improve an tri. In October, Phung Hoang Training Schools were 
opened in MR II and IV, and by December, 849 GVN personnel had attended the PHTS in 
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MR III.25 These schools, as well as growing staff experience and increased GVN/American 
pressure, led to noticeable advances in specific targeting during mid/late-1969. In 
February, the Phoenix directorate had requested lists of specific targets from every 
province, the vast majority of which could only provide lists of villages where the VCI 
reportedly had a strong presence. However, by 31 July, many provinces could now provide 
a number of specific individuals and details about them.26 The most notable improvement 
occurred in Gia Dinh Province, as their February list included close to no specific targets 
while their July list was composed almost entirely of these targets. Additionally, most of 
Gia Dinh’s dossiers provided an array of details, including the cadre’s name/cover name, 
date of birth and position within the VCI.27  
Increasingly detailed dossiers naturally resulted in a higher volume of successful 
operations: two of Long Khanh Province’s districts launched ten successful specific 
targeting operations between 13 and 20 August; In Long An Province, the Propaganda, 
Indoctrination and Cultural Section Chief for Can Duoc District, a priority mid-level VCI, was 
neutralised in August; and frequent specific targeting operations in Saigon, Hue and 
Danang had severely weakened the VCI’s grip over the population in these cities.28 In the 
most successful provinces, VCI captured during operations were interrogated rapidly, 
subsequent intelligence was disseminated to the local DIOCC or PIOCC, and quick reaction 
operations were then immediately launched to neutralise further cadre. Occasionally, this 
resulted in devastating cycles of capture, interrogation and capture; as one VCI rallier 
explained in August, Phoenix operations had led to the VCI in Long An being ‘torn apart’.29  
While specific targeting was now being implemented in most provinces across South 
Vietnam, the concept was virtually non-existent in others. Hau Nghia’s PIOCC, for instance, 
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had not successfully targeted a single cadre by the end of the year.30 Daniel M. Smith, a 
Hau Nghia Phoenix adviser, explained that the province’s failure was due both to constant 
GVN transfers, and the head of the province’s Phung Hoang operations devolving authority 
to the Police Special Branch representative, who paid the programme little attention.31 
Even in provinces where specific targeting was being implemented, it remained limited, 
examples of which were Phu Yen and the above praised Long An. Only 16 percent of the 
cadre neutralised in November in these provinces were, prior to being neutralised, listed 
on blacklists, which listed known VCI cadre within each province. Therefore, only a 
maximum of 16 percent of reported neutralisations could have resulted from specific 
targeting operations, since the concept necessitated a cadre’s identity and location be 
ascertained before an operation could be orchestrated/launched.32  
Developments pertaining to phase two, thus far discussed, have highlighted the progress 
and limitations of Phoenix during this period, while the following two case studies 
illuminate the threat Vietnamisation posed the programme in the long term. In October 
1969, a new Regional Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centre (RIOCC) was 
opened. The centre’s construction was originally intended to be funded by the GVN, but a 
lack of resources and capital resulted in the project stagnating by April. Consequently, US 
officials agreed to fund and construct the centre, which was then completed and opened 
within six months, thus acting as a testament to American capabilities, while also revealing 
the GVN’s inability to support Phoenix without American assistance.33 The establishment 
of Village Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centres (VIOCCs) further highlighted 
this necessity for American funding. Introduced in 1969 to strengthen Phoenix’s presence 
at the village level, assist the ‘anti-VCI publicity program’, and encourage village 
participation in intelligence gathering, VIOCCs were being established across the 
countryside by phase two, with some already producing worthwhile intelligence.34 While 
VIOCCs were, officially, not funded by American channels, Long Khanh’s province Phoenix 
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adviser identified that DIOCC funding was increasing following the establishment of 
VIOCCs, and explained that the surplus funds were likely being distributed amongst the 
village centres.35  Not only does this adviser’s theory seem plausible, as GVN channels 
lacked the affluence to support every VIOCC nationwide, but this also, in conjunction with 
the first case study, highlights that Phoenix’s longevity depended on American support and 
funding which would later be withdrawn under the policy of Vietnamisation. 
During and after the conclusion of phase two of the 1969 Pacification and Development 
Plan in October, a series of MACV directives were issued relating to the Phoenix 
Programme.  Directive #381-2, 30 December 1969, established the ‘Volunteer Informant 
Program’, which offered rewards to anyone who provided information on the VC, PAVN, 
or VCI, that led to successful neutralisation missions or similar positive outcomes. Since 
rewards were scaled depending on the information’s value, and as these rewards were 
only bestowed when intelligence led to successful outcomes, the potential for corruption 
and/or fake intelligence was largely curbed from the outset.36 Informants were fruitful 
assets to Phoenix agencies, and so the introduction of this reward scheme aided in 
increasing the number of such assets. Other directives during this period focused less on 
enhancing Phoenix, and more on limiting US commitment to the programme. MACV 
Directive #550-4, 12 November 1969, capped interpreters at one per district advisory 
team.37 District level Phoenix activity had also been impacted earlier that year by MACV 
Directive #10-20, 23 May, instructing that each District Senior Adviser double as the District 
Phoenix Adviser.38 Furthermore, while it was decided in December 1969 that the PRU 
would retain CIA funding until at least the end of 1971, it was also affirmed that the GVN 
would assume all other responsibilities for these units by July 1971. Although Bunker 
beheld the now 4,200 strong PRU as ‘the most effective method…to strike directly at the 
covert communist apparatus’, these units were increasingly controversial on account of 
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the similarity between their guerrilla-like tactics and those of the VC, as well as acts of 
brutality committed before joining ICEX. Consequently, the PRU was destined to eventually 
be stripped of American involvement.39 The latter three points in this paragraph pertain to 
Vietnamisation and the gradual reduction of American commitment which it facilitated, 
while the previously discussed cases studies highlight both the necessity and 
impermanence of American support. In conjunction, these factors reveal that while 
Vietnasmisation was only negatively impacting Phoenix to a minor extent during 1969, later 
acceleration of the policy would inevitably be disastrous for the programme. 
To reflect on the year as a whole, 1969 represented a period of continued progress for 
Phoenix. Advancements had been made in cooperation, training and specific targeting, 
particularly during phase two, while less effective reforms in aspects such as an tri had at 
the very least established basic operating procedures for the system. Colby stated that 
Phoenix’s progress by the end of the year, notably in MR IV, had been a ‘resounding 
success’, while a separate report praised the programme’s ‘operational improvements’ 
during the second half of the year.40 A direct result of Phoenix’s growing efficiency and 
capability had been a reduction in VC taxation and terror activities by late-1969. 41 
Furthermore, during the second congress of South Vietnam’s communist party, which 
convened in September, it was averred that pacification, Phoenix and Chieu Hoi posed 
greater threats than any other allied programmes.42 Although a US annual report revealed 
that only around 20 percent of documented neutralisations in 1969 resulted from Phoenix 
operations or intelligence, the report also stated that this figure was based on 
approximations, and therefore unreliable. Furthermore, it was noted that the proportion 
of ralliers which could be credited to Phoenix was also inaccurate, due to difficulties in 
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identifying the motivations behind a cadre’s decision to rally. Given that ralliers constituted 
25 percent of all reported neutralisations in 1969, and as Phoenix’s psychological 
operations and general impact on cadre morale were both substantial during the year, the 
percentage of neutralisations attributable to Phoenix was likely higher than that which was 
reported.43  
American advisory support had increased during 1969, with 450 advisers serving in 
Phoenix, and 101 in the PRU, by the end of the year.44 One staff report in early-1970 stated 
that ‘Continuing progress in pacification appears to depend, too, on maintaining a large 
American advisory infrastructure’.45 This further highlights that Phoenix’s ability to damage 
the VCI relied on persistent American advisory support. American monetary support, 
another key stipulation for progress and success, remained substantial in 1969, as CORDS 
had expended 172 million piastres.46 US support was also provided in the form of vehicles, 
technology, resources and logistics. This assistance would be vital going forward, as 
shortcomings remained within the programme, including an tri’s sluggishness and leniency, 
the limited implementation of specific targeting, poor cooperation between participating 
agencies in various provinces, and the large number of American and Vietnamese staff who 
had not yet received training. American troops were also crucial, as not only did these units 
prevent conventional attacks against pacification programmes, but they were now actively 
participating in counter-VCI operations. However, American participation within Phoenix 
was not everlasting. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Vietnamisation was responsible 
for both increased and decreased levels of support for Phoenix: the programme’s role in 
facilitating the implementation of Vietnamisation ensured that it would enjoy American 
support for some time, yet successful implementation of this policy would expedite the 
removal of this same support, as Vietnamisation’s purpose was ultimately to reduce 
American commitment to the war. Nevertheless, the negative impact of Vietnamisation on 
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Phoenix would be dwarfed by the overall benefits of the policy until late-1971, and the 
programme would continue to inflict increasing damage upon the VCI for the next two 
years. 
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Chapter Four 
Cambodia, Phoenix and Progress in the Village War 
At the dawn of 1970, the Phoenix Programme was in the best position thus far to combat 
the VCI. The Nixon administration’s first year saw considerable development for the 
programme, as far more resources were allocated to pacification during 1969 than any year 
of the Johnson era, subsequently allowing Phoenix’s infrastructure and capabilities to 
expand rapidly. Furthermore, not only had the programme continued to improve internally 
since 1968, but allied troops had exacted a heavy toll on communist forces by early-1970, 
reducing their capacity to assault pacification efforts. As had been the case in 1969, CORDS, 
and by extension William Colby, were heavily involved in formulating the 1970 pacification 
plan, titled ‘Protection of the People from Terrorism’.1 Pacification had little to do with 
counter-terrorism, and the plan’s title was actually an attempt to make pacification appear 
more ethical and legitimate, undoubtedly because of concerns regarding the American 
domestic front: the anti-war movement in the United States had long contested the 
morality of American support for the GVN, a government that few saw as democratic, and 
so pacification efforts to expand GVN authority were poised to face criticism. Phoenix, for 
example, had attracted the attention of Western media since 1968, principally because of 
the programme’s covert nature, its conspicuous name, accusations of corruption and 
assassinations, and the guerrilla-like tactics of the PRU. The attention garnered by Phoenix 
forced Colby to defend the programme’s ethics in February 1970, when ‘Senator J. William 
Fulbright’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee held four days of hearings on 
pacification’.2 Likely as a result of this growing controversy, which will be discussed fully 
during Chapter Five, the pacification plan for 1970 placed more emphasis than those of 
previous years on improving both the programme’s public image, and its appearance as a 
predominately Vietnamese operation.  Nevertheless, overall, the plan’s primary objectives 
pertaining to Phoenix continued to focus on internal reform and improving effectiveness. 
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In early-1970, new reforms were introduced for Phoenix. From January onwards, captured 
and arrested VCI suspects could only be reported as neutralised after being sentenced to 
six months imprisonment or more. This made sentencing statistics more accurate, as prior 
to 1970, suspects were reported as neutralised upon capture/arrest, and were supposedly 
removed from the final neutralisation report if they had been found innocent or sentenced 
to six months or less.3 An additional amendment, on 30 May, stated that arrested and 
captured VCI could only be reported as neutralised if sentenced to a year or more, thereby 
extending the amount of time neutralisation reports remained accurate for.4 The result of 
these reforms to an tri, coupled with previously stated demands for Province Security 
Committees to adhere to national guidelines, was that ‘by mid-1970, PSCs were functioning 
fairly well and improving each month’.5 On 1 February, to assist specific targeting, DIOCCs 
were directed to introduce three lists:  A list, for ten priority targets; B list, also known as 
the ‘Target List’, for cadre whose dossier included three or more reports that evidenced 
their identity and position within the VCI (confirmed VCI); and C list, for cadre whose 
dossier required more information (identified VCI).6 Subsequently, personnel could now 
easily ascertain which targets required more or less attention. On 3 February, Province 
Senior Advisers were bestowed the authority to acquire information regarding the VCI 
structure in provinces that bordered their own from the PSAs of those bordering provinces. 
This was beneficial because the VCI used different regional, provincial and district borders 
to those of the GVN and US, and so if a VCI provincial structure existed within the bounds 
of two or three GVN provinces, the PSAs from those provinces could now pool their 
respective intelligence collections against their common foe.7 These foregoing policies are 
examples of the progressing efficiency of Phoenix, the primary result of which was the 
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programme's increasing ability to damage the VCI. The extent and impact of this ability by 
mid-1970 was demonstrated during the Cambodian Campaign, lasting from 29 April to 22 
July 1970.   
Launched by Nixon and Thiệu, the Cambodian Campaign was a land and air assault aimed 
at destabilising the communist apparatus within the areas of Cambodia that bordered 
South Vietnam. ARVN and US troops entering Cambodia were tasked with destroying 
communist strongholds, infrastructure elements, weapon and rice caches, supply lines and 
hideouts.8 As most allied military operations would be launched into areas of Cambodia 
that bordered South Vietnam’s provinces in MR III, this region’s Phoenix agencies and 
centres were given firm instruction from the national level to take advantage of the 
campaign by increasing operations and inter-agency coordination. The campaign 
presented an opportunity to shatter much of MR III’s shadow apparatus: not only would 
military assaults within Cambodia force VCI cadre operating and/or hiding there to return 
to Vietnam along with thousands of refugees, where screening operations could separate 
cadre from civilians, but the increased presence of allied troops within MR III would lead 
to hidden cadre in the region’s villages and hamlets revealing themselves while attempting 
to flee to less hazardous areas.  
During the campaign’s opening weeks, no major increase in operations or neutralisations 
occurred as a direct result of events in Cambodia, with reports from provinces such as Bien 
Hoa and Gia Dinh stating that no opportunities had yet presented themselves. 9 
Additionally, the initial flood of refugees from Cambodia overwhelmed the screening 
capabilities of Phoenix’s participating agencies, particularly the Police Special Branch and 
Military Security Service.10 The campaign had, however, instigated a marked increase in 
motivation and participation on the GVN’s part by mid-May, notably in MR III. Do Cao Tri, 
Phung Hoang Committee Chairman for MR III; and Lieutenant Colonel Tham, deputy for 
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MR III’s Phung Hoang Programme; were inspired by the Cambodian Campaign to the extent 
that during May, both placed pressure on their subordinates to invigorate personnel and 
‘make efforts to identify and exploit’ opportunities presented by the campaign.11  
By late-May, Allied incursions into Cambodia and MR III began creating opportunities for 
Phoenix, while improved GVN motivation allowed for more frequent and successful 
exploitation of these opportunities. The retreat of Tay Ninh’s entire shadow apparatus, as 
a result of encroaching allied forces, not only decimated its organisational structure, but 
the sudden surfacing of its cadre allowed local Phoenix centres to identify, locate and 
neutralise many of these members.12 In Long An, owing to American ‘advisory emphasis’ 
and the province’s ‘strong willed’ chief, Colonel Tu, day-time platoon operations increased 
in number from 769 in April to 1707 in May. This, aided by PSYOP campaigns, led to a steep 
rise in neutralisations and ralliers, further impairing the Vietcong Infrastructure within Long 
An, which had been slowly eroded by Phoenix activity since late-1969.13 In Long Khanh, 
improved motivation among GVN staff resulted in increased efforts to take advantage of 
the Cambodian Campaign, notably through PRU and NPFF ambushes, specific targeting and 
Chieu Hoi operations, expanding screening staff and centres, and training ralliers to guide 
military forces to VCI strongholds.14  
It was also during this period, on 3 June, that national-level authority over Phung Hoang 
was transferred from the Interior Minister’s office to the Directorate General of the 
National Police (DGNP), initiating a transition where all PIOCC/DIOCC leadership roles filled 
by South Vietnamese military/civilian officers would eventually be assumed by National 
Police personnel.15  The placing of Phung Hoang under NP authority would occur on a 
province-by-province basis, and American advisers were tasked with determining when 
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DIOCC/PIOCCs were ready to be handed over to NP leadership.16 This transition had been 
envisioned since the programme’s inception, as police forces are inherently better suited 
for combatting domestic political threats within civilian populations. According to Colby, 
Phung Hoang was placed under the NP instead of the Police Special Branch, which was a 
more effective counter-VCI agency, because the programme needed to be more overt and 
within the public eye, therefore illustrating the impact of Phoenix’s poor public image on 
national-level decisions.17 
In order to capitalise fully on the VCI’s weakened position during ongoing Cambodian 
operations, the ‘”Toan Thang”’ (Total Victory) Campaign was launched on 9 June, tasking 
MR III’s counter-VCI agencies with mounting an all-out assault against the shadow 
apparatus: PIOCCs would locate exposed VCI targets for DIOCC operations; specific 
targeting and PSYOPS operations would occur more frequently; and Phoenix’s publicity 
campaign would be expanded.18  Additionally, temporary prisons were erected, RF/PFs 
would provide units for operations, and PRUs were positioned near the Cambodian border 
to gather intelligence.19  
Toan Thang was largely successful. It’s Implementation at the province level was observed 
by Charles S. Whitehouse as being ‘excellent’, with the province chiefs of ‘Binh Tuy, Gia 
Dinh, Phuoc Long, Ninh Duong and Long Khanh’ all complimented on their guidance and 
leadership.20 Intelligence collection and exploitation had improved, specific targeting was 
occurring to some extent in every province, and certain province chiefs, such as the chief 
for Binh Duong, had orchestrated an unprecedented level of coordination between 
previously competing agencies. PSYOP campaigns induced several key VCI members to 
rally, including a province-level Deputy Political Section Chief in Gia Dinh. Frequent district-
level specific targeting operations in Long An had resulted in the capture of numerous 
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cadre.21 In Tay Ninh, the VCI’s medical establishments and supply lines were obliterated.22 
The VCI in SR-2, a provincial territory that existed in MR III within the aforementioned VC 
province boundary system, had been crippled, with all but a few of its leadership having 
fled or been captured.23 By late June, the refugee screening/interrogation process was 
better manned and operated than it had been a month before, and accordingly, the 
number of refugees screened, and VCI discovered, increased greatly.24 At the conclusion 
of Toan Thang in early-July, Phoenix had not only experienced substantial internal 
development, but had, in conjunction with US/ARVN military operations, dealt the VCI in 
MR III a heavy blow. The VCI in MR I, II and IV had also suffered to some degree, as 
improving GVN motivation across the country resulted in expanded operations in every 
region.  
The Cambodian Campaign concluded on 22 July. It had been fruitful in both the 
conventional military sense, as communist armaments were captured in abundance and 
their supply lines disrupted, and in terms of counter-VCI activity25  James B. Egger, Phoenix 
coordinator for MR III, proclaimed the campaign to have been ‘the best single event in 
support of the PHUNG HOANG Programme’.26 He also affirmed that, in addition to pressure 
from American advisers and GVN leadership, a key instigating force behind the 
‘rejuvenation of the program’ during the campaign had been the placing of Phung Hoang 
under NP authority.27 This was an accurate statement, as police personnel functioning 
within the programme were far more accepting of NP authority than political or military 
authority. However, while the DGNP’s assumption of responsibility had taken place rapidly 
and efficiently at the national level, and while leadership roles within provincial centres 
were also being assumed by NP personnel at an acceptable pace, this process was taking 
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considerably longer at the district level, owing to a shortage of qualified NP officers.28 
Resultantly, Phoenix/CORDS officials did not expect this process to be completed until mid-
1971. This foreshadowed events that would occur in 1972, when the NP were required to 
assume almost all responsibilities for the programme, but would lack both the resources 
and manpower necessary to ensure that this transition was rapidly and efficiently 
executed. 
The Cambodian Campaign was overwhelmingly beneficial for the Phoenix Programme, yet 
it also illuminated the consequences of reducing American military forces in areas where 
pacification programmes operated. The redeployment of American troops to Cambodia 
and South Vietnam’s bordering provinces had reduced security in the areas where these 
troops were previously stationed. In MR II, for example, US/ARVN troop redeployments led 
to security in some now-exposed areas dropping by as much as 34 percent, which was 
calculated through the total number of hamlets that were either contested, GVN 
controlled, or communist controlled. Within these areas, VC/VCI counter-pacification 
activities retook control over large portions of the region’s rural population.29 In Phu Yen, 
a coastal province in MR II, GVN Phoenix personnel functioning within villages and hamlets 
were increasingly the target of assassination/capture attempts by the Vietcong.30  This 
demonstrates that Phoenix’s progress was dependant, not only on American advisory, 
financial and material support, but also on US military forces. Their continued presence 
within South Vietnam was critical to maintaining rural security and defending pacification 
efforts. The ongoing withdrawal of US forces under Vietnamisation, which had reduced 
troop numbers from over 500,000 in 1968 to 334,600 by late-1970, would by 1972 leave 
Phoenix exposed to communist retaliation.31  
In August 1970, Egger asserted that Phoenix had improved to such an extent, it was now 
possible for some American advisers to be withdrawn, going as far to suggest that each 
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advisory team could now ‘cover two districts’.32 However, this view, held by many within 
CORDS and MACV, failed to recognise that US advisory support was fundamental, not only 
to improving the programme, but also to maintaining its current level of effectiveness. 
Tenuous cooperation between participating agencies was often sustained by careful 
liaising between each agency’s American advisers, and GVN staff motivation frequently 
depended on persistent American pressure. Furthermore, American advisers were the sole 
cause of improvement in certain districts. For example, Lieutenant John L. Cook, Phoenix 
adviser for Di An District, Bien Hoa Province, had singlehandedly turned the district around 
between 1968 and 1970. A master of opportunities, Cook ensured that every disillusioned 
VCI rallier was exploited for intelligence relating to other cadre targets. He was so vital to 
the intelligence gathering and exploitation mechanism, that the district chief for Di An had 
on multiple occasions successfully requested for Cook’s tour to be extended.33 Therefore, 
the concept of American withdrawal posed a critical threat to Phoenix, as the programme’s 
continued progress would assist in justifying the withdrawal of American advisers, 
subsequently accelerating the programme’s downfall.  
Notwithstanding the continued need for American support being abundantly clear, the 
Vietnamisation of Phoenix persisted during 1970, and was further accelerated by the US 
government’s growing desire to reduce its affiliation with the controversial programme. 
The PRU had been placed under NP administrative authority on 31 March. American 
terminology and idioms were removed from a number of official documents, memoranda 
and directives, while most references to ‘Phoenix’ were replaced with ‘Phung Hoang’.34 
Additionally, US advisers were given questionnaires throughout mid/late-1970, querying 
which DIOCCs/PIOCCs in their respective areas of operation would require advisers 
through 1971, the reply to which was most commonly ‘all’.35 While this reply assisted in 
ensuring that most advisory staff would be retained for some time, the issuing of such a 
questionnaire demonstrated the United States’ eagerness to begin decreasing its 
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commitment to Phoenix, particularly as Vietnamisation of the entire war effort continued 
at an increasing pace.  
Interestingly, however, the Vietnamisation of Phoenix had not yet undermined immediate 
requirements for additional advisers, as the advisory effort was expanded during mid/late-
1970. From August onwards, every DIOCC was allocated a Military Intelligence (MI) captain, 
while every PIOCC was allocated an MI major, both of whom had a basic understanding of 
the Vietnamese language. 36  The ‘Military Assistance Security Adviser course’ was 
introduced at Fort Bragg in September, which trained American advisers for operating with 
South Vietnamese counterparts.37 Non-Commission Officer (NCO) intelligence specialists 
were introduced in certain districts as Deputy DIOCC Advisers, tasked with improving 
specific targeting and intelligence gathering.38 As a result of the various American advisory 
training programmes established between 1968 and 1970, the quality of district level 
advisers in particular had improved greatly, both in their understanding of counter-VCI 
activity, and their ability to form rapports with Vietnamese counterparts.  
The 1970 pacification plan concluded on 31 October. It was immediately followed by a 
‘Supplementary Pacification and Development Plan’, lasting from 1 November 1970 to 28 
February 1971, in order to provide additional time for CORDS and the GVN to formulate 
the pacification plan for 1971.39 The supplementary plan called for ‘maximum elimination 
of the VCI and a maximum increase in security’, focusing particularly on increasing the roles 
of police and local forces.40 Trần Văn Hai began gearing the NP towards fulfilling their 
intended role as the ‘principle operating agency of the PH [Phung Hoang] Plan’.41 This 
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included increasing the NP’s ranks by 17,000 officers by the end of 1970, and placing 
pressure on all police agencies to provide the resources and manpower required for the 
programme to succeed in its endeavours.42  
It has proven difficult to locate documents highlighting the events that unfolded during the 
supplementary plan. Nevertheless, several notable developments were uncovered. One 
such development, on 16 December, was Colby’s assignment of additional American 
intelligence officers, including NCO ‘Counterintelligence Specialists’, to provinces with high 
numbers of identified VCI, such as Quang Nam and Kien Hoa.43 Another development was 
the successful implementation of ‘Area Specific Targeting’ in Dinh Duong Province during 
early-January. This strategy focused on identifying villages under covert VCI control, 
establishing an intelligence network within the village to acquire information on the 
identities, roles and behaviours of each cadre, and then launching PRU/NPFF operations to 
eradicate the village’s entire communist apparatus.44 A final development occurred on 11 
January 1971, when a report from Hau Nghia revealed that the province’s counter-VCI 
effort was now enjoying improved communication between police and programme 
personnel, and a soaring quantity of useful intelligence had begun entering its Phoenix 
centres. Hau Nghia had been an example of meagre and sluggish Phoenix activity since the 
programme’s inception, and while poor performance and a lack of specific targeting still 
persisted, it was stressed by Egger that the recent improvements constituted a ‘step in the 
right direction’.45 The reorganisation of Hau Nghia’s Phung Hoang Programme under NP 
authority, and the ‘placement of a US adviser’ in the province’s Military Security Service 
office in late-1970, were cited as the primary causes of this progress.46 In conjunction, 
these developments demonstrate that, as late as February 1971, officials continued to 
adapt, implement new tactics, and improve the Phoenix Programme.   
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In assessing Phoenix between January 1970 and February 1971, a number of summaries 
and reports provide an interesting insight. During 1970, 22,357 VCI were reportedly 
neutralised, 757 more than the annual quota. While VCI neutralisation statistics remained 
inaccurate, this had improved slightly since 1968. Stricter criteria set in 1970, such as 
previously highlighted amendments to the reporting system for captured/arrested VCI 
suspects, had reduced the potential for overestimations.47 Furthermore, in October 1970, 
Egger asserted that the primary cause of many inaccurate neutralisation reports was not 
overestimations, but ‘just the opposite’.48 Egger highlighted that VCI killed by participating 
agencies or combat troops were often not reported in instances where there was no 
camera available for providing photo evidence of the neutralised cadre, as well as when 
coordination between these units and Phoenix centres was poor.49 Therefore, while the 
1970 neutralisation count was inaccurate, it was less so than in previous years, and many 
KIA inaccuracies had likely derived from underestimations rather than overestimations. In 
relation to specific targeting, 63 percent of neutralised VCI in 1970 had been identified 
prior to neutralisation.50 This represented a significant improvement in specific targeting, 
as although no earlier statistics on this subject could be found, such a percentage 
contrasted greatly with Colby’s declaration, in July 1969, that too many neutralisations had 
been ‘by accident’.51 Regarding the quality of neutralisations, a report from 1971 revealed 
that 24.8 percent of all VCI neutralised in 1970 had functioned at the district level or higher, 
as opposed to 13 percent in 1968. This further highlights the growing effectiveness of 
specific targeting, while also demonstrating that the VCI were sustaining increasingly heavy 
losses above the village and hamlet level.52   
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In spite of the increasing number of mid/high-level neutralisations being achieved, Phoenix 
continued to be criticised in the US government, particularly by Secretary of Defense 
Melvin R. Laird, as the majority of neutralisations still occurred at the ‘lower echelons’.53 
Moyar has rebutted this criticism, highlighting that the lowest echelon of any hierarchal 
structure almost always comprises the highest number of functionaries, and so the notion 
that high-level VCI neutralisations could ever match or surpass low-level neutralisations is 
nonsensical.54 Moreover, this disparity between mid/high and low-level neutralisations did 
not, as Laird affirmed, leave the ‘overall party organization viable’. 55  This is because 
although the shadow government’s leadership remained relatively intact, destruction of 
the lower echelons destabilised their control over the population. Additionally, Andradé 
has identified that the volume of ‘mid-level’ VCI being neutralised by 1970 had proven 
sufficient to sever the link between high-level and low-level cadre in numerous 
districts/provinces, thus preventing the shadow government from disseminating 
instructions and policies to the crucial village/hamlet level.56 
To conclude, between January 1970 and February 1971, the Phoenix Programme dealt a 
severe blow to the Vietcong Infrastructure and achieved a marked rise in motivation, 
participation, internal efficiency and effectiveness. Amendments to an tri, target lists, and 
cross-province intelligence sharing, aided specific targeting operations and improved the 
accuracy of neutralisation reports. The launch of the Cambodian Campaign, pressure 
applied by GVN national/regional officials and American advisers, and the transfer of Phung 
Hoang under NP authority, had instigated a major rise in motivation among Phoenix 
personnel. Furthermore, counter-VCI activity and military operations during the 
Cambodian Campaign greatly impaired VCI operations in Cambodia and MR III’s bordering 
provinces. Developments during the supplementary plan revealed that Phoenix remained 
capable of adapting and progressing, while annual assessments of the programme were 
increasingly accurate and positive. There were of course limitations to this progress: an tri 
remained plagued by slow processing speeds and instances where reporting guidelines 
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were not adhered to; Phoenix’s efficiency and impact varied across districts, provinces and 
regions; and police assumption of Phung Hoang authority at the district level remained a 
laborious task. Resolving these shortcomings was largely a matter of time and pressure. 
However, much of Phoenix’s progress was maintained by American advisory, financial and 
military support, and so the ongoing Vietnamisation of America’s war effort limited the 
amount of time available. As will be discussed during the following chapters, dependence 
on American support would prove to be the programme’s Achilles heel, particularly 
following July 1971, when the process of Vietnamising counter-VCI activity was accelerated 
exponentially. 
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Chapter Five 
Jumping Ship: Controversy, Accelerated Vietnamisation, and the 
Beginning of the End for the Phoenix Programme 
Between March and December 1971, counter-VCI activity stood at a point where both 
victory and defeat appeared to be on the horizon: the shadow apparatus, having for years 
suffered at the hands of pacification and allied military forces, was in a weaker position 
than ever before, yet the expansion of Vietnamisation now constituted a major threat to 
the programme’s prospects of success. Phoenix continued at first during this period to 
progress and achieve promising results, but would to its detriment be Vietnamised at an 
accelerated pace from late-1971 onwards. The cause of this hastened American 
withdrawal largely lies within the broader context of the Vietnam War. Between February 
and March 1971, the ARVN launched an ill-fated operation into eastern Laos, codenamed 
Lam Son 719, to destroy communist strongpoints. As no American troops participated in 
719, the operation would test whether South Vietnam could successfully face communist 
forces without the aid of US soldiers. To Nixon and Kissinger’s dismay, the operation was a 
failure and the ARVN suffered high casualties, thereby demonstrating South Vietnam’s 
military weakness. Clearly, ensuring the GVN could survive alone required more time than 
Nixon could afford, particularly as he was conscious of the upcoming November 1972 
presidential election, and so his administration moved towards streamlining negotiations 
with Hanoi. 1  Furthermore, Nixon faced increasing political pressure, with American 
popular support for the war dropping in April 1971 to its lowest point thus far and the 
Democrats challenging the administration’s policies at every turn. 2  Because of these 
factors, the president was left with little option but to advance the pace of negotiations 
and withdrawal. The accelerated Vietnamisation of Phoenix can also be linked to the 
controversy surrounding it in the US by mid-1971. The programme had suffered negative 
American media attention since 1968, particularly allegations of unethical and illegal 
activity. By 1971, this controversy had, similarly to controversy surrounding the Vietnam 
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War as a whole, intensified considerably. Phoenix would be the subject of congressional 
hearings, as well as face allegations of assassination, corruption, mass-arrests and torture 
by a number of American politicians, officials and veterans. The cause, accuracy and impact 
of these allegations will, along with all other facets of the Phoenix morality debate, be 
discussed at length later during this chapter. In summary, Chapter Five focuses on the 
programme’s successes and limitations thus far, the morality debate, and the hastening of 
American departure from counter-VCI activity during the second half of 1971.  
By early/mid-1971, it was clear that the VCI were losing the village war. More cadre existed 
within Cambodia than South Vietnam, as many had fled the increasingly hazardous 
country. 3  The COSVN was attempting to recruit more cadre who owned legal 
documentation, as this would assist in concealing the shadow apparatus’s functionaries 
from Phoenix’s intelligence network. 4  Since late-1968, the assumption of VCI roles by 
Vietcong military personnel had become increasingly common, owing to the consistent 
drain on cadre manpower by counter-VCI activity and military operations. Additionally, in 
a growing number of instances, cadre within the infrastructure were being supplemented 
by PAVN officers.5 This highlighted that the apparatus was losing trained cadre faster than 
it could replenish them, the impact of which, as a captured communist document revealed, 
was a decreasing level of proficiency exhibited by cadre by 1971:  
‘…the leadership of the cadre and agencies at various levels was inappropriate…For 
that reason, in this year, the strengthening and training of cadre, agencies, and local 
armed forces have a greater significance and are more pressing’.6 
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Hanoi was attempting to combat pacification through methods as controversial as those 
employed by Phoenix, namely neutralising low-/mid-level GVN officials. This had the 
disadvantage of potentially drawing as much international criticism to the communist 
political struggle as Phoenix had drawn to pacification. However, Hanoi and the COSVN had 
little choice, as they would ‘lose all chance of staging a comeback in the South’ if the VCI 
were destroyed prior to America’s total withdrawal from Vietnam.7  
Counter-VCI activity continued to progress during the first half of 1971. Gerald T. Bartlett, 
Hau Nghia’s senior adviser, stated in May that dossiers were improving, the NPFF were 
‘first rate’, and the district chiefs for Trang Bang and Cu Chi district were committed and 
capable. 8  Additionally, reports from July revealed that although specific targeting and 
cooperation required improvement, the PIOCC was now rapidly exploiting perishable 
intelligence and neutralising key VCI, particularly Village Secretaries and Village Section 
Chiefs.9 A number of other provinces in MR III were inspected during June by John S. Tilton, 
who replaced John Mason as Phoenix Director a month earlier. Tilton was pleased with the 
region’s progress, particularly in Binh Long Province, where the PSA was cited for 
‘exceptional and genuine interest in the program’.10 Other province reports from June 
were similarly positive. Long Thanh and Bien Hoa were noted to be ‘progressing in a 
positive and forward direction’, and Phuoc Tuy was cited for its effective exploitation of 
intelligence.11 Furthermore, the quality of counter-VCI intelligence provided by the village 
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populace had risen in all provinces where the Volunteer Informant Programme had been 
introduced.12 
While Phoenix had proven itself an effective means by which to combat the VCI, 
shortcomings and drawbacks persisted. Corruption was a major problem in MR IV, 
specifically that VCI suspects were bribing GVN officials to release them prior to their trial.13 
Another setback was the continued slow pace at which NP officers were assuming 
leadership positions. A consequence of this was that, in provinces where military officials 
still had considerable authority over the programme, cooperation was poor and police 
personnel were given little direction. The most notable example of this was in Dinh Quan 
District, Long Khanh, where the District Chief, a military officer, asserted that he would 
have no involvement with the police.14 Another area which required improvement was 
specific targeting, as although this was now being employed in every province, the extent 
to which the strategy was used over cordon and search operations varied from area to 
area, with some centres still lacking the qualified staff and intelligence stockpile necessary 
to target individual cadre. Moreover, it had not ceased to be the case that specific targeting 
and inter-agency cooperation relied on consistent American advisory support.  
Vietnamisation continued steadily between March and July. Financial support for the 
programme was increasingly becoming a South Vietnamese responsibility, with American 
funding for 1971, forecasted at 56 million piastres (approximately US$868,000 today), 
being subsidised by 17 million piastres of GVN capital.15 During the first half of the year, 
Colby, Mason, and later Tilton, established their strategy for the eventual departure of 
American advisers. A Phoenix Directorate meeting on 24 March illustrated that the 
‘ultimate objective’ was to give operational control over Phung Hoang to the Police Special 
Branch, while the NP would assume national-level authority and all financial/logistical 
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responsibilities. However, the meeting also stated that the NP and PSB did not yet have the 
resources, training, or authority to direct Phung Hoang and its various participating 
agencies, and so both would require further time to meet these requirements.16  By May, 
a three-phase plan was being advocated, whereby the police would gradually assume 
authority. Phase one involved slowly increasing police responsibilities for the programme; 
Phase two focused on further transferring DIOCCs/PIOCCs, on a province-by-province 
basis, over to police direction. During phase three, Phung Hoang would be transformed 
into an arm of the NP. 17  Furthermore, Tilton emphasised in June that American 
participation should be withdrawn from each province as it became more effective, thus 
highlighting the same flawed approach which had been asserted by Egger in 1970.18 While 
the three-phase plan was viable on paper, it had been conceived at a time when American 
advisers were not expected to have been fully withdrawn from the programme until mid-
1973.19 As hindsight can reveal, the American advisory effort would in fact have departed 
entirely by late-1972, on account of accelerated Vietnamisation from late-1971 onwards, 
and so the police would assume all responsibilities for the programme before they had fully 
developed the capability to do so. Furthermore, regardless of the plan’s viability as means 
to withdrawal from the programme, the fact that such a departure was being formulated 
at a time when US participation remained crucial and the VCI had not been defeated 
suggests that an ulterior motive was at play. That is, because American departure from the 
programme was being planned for reasons other than the VCI being defeated or US 
support no longer being required, it is unlikely that the three-phase plan was motivated 
solely, if at all, by considerations for the village war. It is more likely that the push towards 
departure was the result of the United States’ growing determination to reduce its 
commitment to the Vietnam War as a whole, particularly following the political 
developments discussed during this chapter’s introduction. These developments, in 
conjunction with the controversy surrounding Phoenix by 1971, would prove to have an 
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even greater impact on the United States’ departure from counter-VCI activity during the 
second half of the year, when Vietnamisation of the programme would, as a result, be 
adversely accelerated.  
However, the morality debate surrounding Phoenix must be discussed before the second 
half of 1971 can be addressed. The House Committee on Government Operations opened 
hearings on the Phoenix Programme in mid-July 1971. Colby stood at these hearings on 19 
July, barraged by a series of questions pertaining specifically to the programme.20 This had 
come three months after Jerome R. Waldie, a democrat member of the House of 
Representatives, argued that Phoenix had been responsible for a number of unethical 
activities. Waldie asserted that a statement in an MACV directive from 18 May 1970, which 
emphasised that Americans were ‘specifically unauthorised to engage in assassinations’, 
implied that Americans had been performing such actions.21 Furthermore, Waldie argued 
both that the killing, capturing, arresting and sentencing of thousands of suspects was a 
breach of legality, as these individuals were not given true court hearings, and that Phoenix 
was a potential tool for corruption and ‘political suppression’. 22  Identifying the actual 
extent to which Phoenix caused/instigated immoral activity requires an in-depth analysis 
of both the various arguments made by scholars/American officials during and after the 
programme’s lifetime, and primary source material pertaining to this subject. Therefore, 
the following paragraphs will discuss the various unethical activities which Phoenix was 
accused of instigating/participating in throughout its history.  
A common accusation against Phoenix was that it was an assassination programme. In 
addition to Waldie’s comments, Theodore Jacqueney, a former official for the United 
States Agency for International Development, who had served in Vietnam in 1970, was 
cited in a congressional report on US assistance programmes in Vietnam as having stated 
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 60 
 
that American advisers were ‘going around killing Vietnamese People’.23 Other proponents 
of the assassination programme argument include scholars such as Douglas Valentine, who 
states that ‘VCI members were brutally murdered along with their families or neighbors as 
a means of terrorizing the neighboring population into a state of submission’, and Alfred 
McCoy, who labels the programme as a ‘murderous covert operation’.24  
However, most evidence reveals that while unjust killings did occur on occasion, they were 
neither common nor sanctioned. First, as discussed in Chapter One, Phoenix had a graded 
list of methods for neutralising VCI, which cited killing as the least preferable. This is 
unsurprising because killing potential sources of intelligence was counterproductive, 
particularly for an intelligence programme such as Phoenix. Second, during the 
programme’s lifetime, rallies and captures accounted for more neutralisations than 
fatalities did, and although the death toll for neutralised VCI was high, these were not 
assassinations, as most KIA cadre died during military engagements or situations where a 
neutralising force saw no safe or viable way to capture their target.25 Third, Zalin Grant 
highlights that Phoenix’s reputation as an assassination campaign largely derived from 
brutal actions committed by the PRU prior to being placed within ICEX. While PRUs became 
less brutal after becoming a participant within the programme, public attention primarily 
focused on the darker past of these units.26 Although it was still common for PRUs to use 
lethal force against VCI targets during the 1970s, this was because cadre were often 
accompanied by armed guards, thus making arrest attempts hazardous. Fourth, 
Valentine’s argument that Phoenix operations were aimed at ‘terrorizing’ the population 
is illogical, as the programme represented one of the three prongs of pacification, which 
focused on winning the hearts and minds of the peasantry through political, economic and 
security programmes; thus, actively attempting to terrorise the public was 
counterproductive to pacification. Finally, in regards to the MACV directive cited by Waldie, 
this was not issued in response to Americans committing immoral acts. Rather, it was an 
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26 Zalin Grant, Facing the Phoenix: The CIA and the Political Defeat of the United States in Vietnam (W. W. 
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extension of a CORDS directive from October 1969, issued in order to cover Colby and 
Phoenix in the event that the story of an American artillery officer, who had refused to 
become a Phoenix adviser on the grounds of moral ambiguity, resulted in an over-
exaggerated perception of the programme as an assassination operation. 27  As the 
foregoing factors illustrate, acts of assassination were neither preferable, practical, 
sanctioned nor common.  
Another accusation faced by Phoenix was that it was a torture programme. In 1971, 
Kenneth Barton Osborn, who served with MI groups in Vietnam during 1967/68, stood 
before a congressional committee and declared that every suspect who he had observed 
being interrogated under Phoenix had ‘died and the majority were either tortured to death 
or things like thrown from a helicopter’.28 Mark Moyar, who spent considerable time and 
effort researching Osborn, found that his claims were not supported by any evidence, were 
refuted by his co-workers in Vietnam, and were disproven by a ‘wealth of concrete 
information’ provided by the ‘U.S. Army Intelligence Command’.29 Although torture did 
occur within Phoenix, individuals such as Osborn exaggerated the frequency and brutality 
of these acts. Many American advisers, such as Bruce Lawlor and Rex Wilson, have 
explained that they permitted limited torture, such as slapping, pushing and ‘putting a VC’s 
head in a pail of water’, because it often elicited accurate intelligence.30 More brutal forms 
of torture happened on occasion, although these were regularly either halted by American 
advisers, or only permitted in instances of great urgency.31 Furthermore, torture was one 
of many approaches for extracting intelligence. Other methods included treating suspects 
respectfully to elicit cooperation, or threatening to spread rumours that they were already 
assisting the GVN, which would result in VC retaliation against their families.32 Whenever 
specific intelligence was not required immediately, or the individual being interrogated was 
likely to withstand torture, the carrot was generally preferred over the stick as it was more 
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effective. Therefore, while torture occurred within Phoenix, this was one of many methods 
used, and was neither as brutal nor as commonplace as some have contested.  
Corruption allegations were also prominent. In addition to Waldie’s assertion that the 
programme constituted a potential tool for corruption, Donald Luce, an agricultural 
volunteer who spent twelve years in Vietnam, argued that Phoenix staff could extort funds 
from anyone by threatening to target them as a member of the VCI.33 Additionally, Douglas 
Valentine asserts that the an tri system was a ‘boondoggle for corrupt GVN officials’, 
whereby innocent civilians were held perpetually if they failed to pay for their release.34 As 
was the case in most GVN agencies/institutions, corruption was a key issue for Phoenix, 
particularly in MR IV and provinces such as Bien Hoa. However, not only was corruption 
less common or severe than its detractors argue(d), but American/GVN officials had 
persistently reduced its presence since Phoenix’s inception. In regards to mass arrests and 
extorting funds, James R. Ward, the CIA’s regional officer for the Mekong Delta during 
1967/68, stated the following:  
‘If someone took money here and there for a favour or took something small from 
a VC family, that would be considered normal. On the other hand, if someone 
harassed or arrested innocent civilians and forced them to pay large bribes, that 
would be considered corrupt, and people would get upset about it. As a result, the 
latter occurred much less often’.35 
Moyar has also refuted the argument that Phoenix prompted mass arrests, revealing that 
the number of civilian prisoners, including both an tri and regular inmates, actually declined 
from ‘45,000 to 41,000’ between 1967 and 1970.36  
Regarding other forms of corruption, Major Hein, the district chief for Long Thanh District, 
Bien Hoa, until January 1971, was proven in late-1969 to have both accommodated the 
VCI, and been involved in the local black market.37 Additionally, in MR IV, a serious issue in 
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1971 was that VCI suspects were bribing personnel to secure their release. However, there 
is little evidence to suggest that these examples were the result of Phoenix, as similar 
situations could, and did, take place prior to the formation of ICEX. Rather, corruption 
pertaining to counter-VCI operations improved during Phoenix’s reign: 113 district and 
province chiefs were removed from their position for corruption in 1968 alone; there was 
seldom corruption in Hau Nghia from mid-1970 onwards, which contrasts greatly with 
earlier years; and corrupt district chiefs in Bien Hoa and Long Khanh were reassigned in 
1970 and 1971 respectively.38 Corruption persisted as a major issue within Phoenix until 
the programme’s end, yet the foregoing factors illuminate that it was not ubiquitous, was 
often exaggerated, and declined between 1968 and 1971. Consequently, it is more likely 
that Phoenix did not cause or exacerbate corruption, but rather made strides in attempting 
to overcome it. 
Therefore, allegations of unethical activity within, or as a result of, Phoenix, were 
frequently exaggerated. It is also worth noting that while certain unethical actions, such as 
torture and corruption, did occur within the programme, these acts took place in every 
facet of the Vietnam War, particularly the conventional military side. This begs the 
question, why was Phoenix targeted by such accusations? Interestingly, the answer would 
partly appear to be the programme’s title. Andradé explains that when ‘Phoenix was ICEX 
few in the [American] press paid it much attention’, as the original title was far less eye-
catching.39 Andradé is supported by Moyar, who asserts that ‘Phoenix became a magnet 
for criticism on account of its name’.40 Not only did the term Phoenix garner mass-media 
attention, but the inherent renown of such a staple of western culture and Greek 
mythology gave rise to inaccurate connotations of mystery and ethical ambiguity; 
resultantly, as Gerald DeGroot highlights, the negative moral implications of Phoenix were 
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exaggerated for the sake of tabloids and ‘sensationalist rumour’.41 In addition to its name, 
the rise of inaccurate allegations against Phoenix can also be attributed to controversy 
surrounding the PRU, as the reputation they developed from activities that predominately 
occurred prior to ICEX had not faded despite their actions becoming far less brutal since 
1967. Notwithstanding that most accusations brought against Phoenix were exaggerated, 
their impact on American commitment to counter-VCI activity was substantial, particularly 
from July 1971 onwards.  
During the second half of 1971, the process of Vietnamising the Phoenix Programme was 
accelerated exponentially. This was first signalled by the Phung Hoang Re-examination 
(PHREEX) Study. PHREEX was completed by the Phoenix Directorate in draft form on 20 
July 1971, and focused on establishing a plan for ‘more effective action against the VCI’. 
However, unlike previous reports and studies, PHREEX openly stated that withdrawal of 
American support would ‘take place at a faster rate than previously planned’. While it did 
focus on correcting issues within the programme, this centred on ensuring there was a 
viable counter-VCI programme in place by the time American participation had been fully 
withdrawn. 42  Therefore, the study’s primary purpose would appear not to be that of 
furthering the progress of counter-VCI activity, but facilitating American withdrawal. The 
proposals made in PHREEX were revised twice by American officials and advisers before 
being approved by Bunker and Abrams in late-September, who then implemented it as 
official US policy. 43  Several more adjustments were made by the GVN, who also then 
implemented the policy, on 2 December.44 
There were a number of principle policies that resulted from PHREEX. Over a transitional 
period, the NP would assume national-level authority and overall responsibility for the 
programme, while the PSB would assume the primary intelligence role. 45  American 
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advisers would be withdrawn as the police assumed more responsibilities, and the Phoenix 
Directorate would eventually be closed. 46  DIOCCs/PIOCCs would eventually be 
consolidated within ‘Police Operations Centres’ (POCs), which would run the police’s day-
to-day counter-VCI activity.47 Phung Hoang staff would now be provided by the NP as 
‘organic personnel’, rather than being attached to the programme from participating 
agencies.48 Although many of these policies were not dissimilar from the plans drawn up 
earlier in the year, PHREEX, and examples of Vietnamisation already occurring during 
mid/late-1971, emphasised that the process would now be fast-tracked.  
As late as July 1971, the total removal of American advisers from Phoenix was not 
scheduled to take place until mid-1973. However, by late-1971, the vast majority were now 
expected to have departed by mid-1972. 49  Under the new policy, from January 1972 
onwards, advisers would be withdrawn from provinces in sequence of most-to-least 
effective/efficient counter-VCI operation: measured by a number of criteria, including 
‘Results of DIOCC/PIOCC inspections’, ‘Status of NP Control’ and ‘Compliance with PSC 
procedures’, advisers in the provinces deemed most successful were to be removed first, 
thus embodying the aforementioned flawed approach to Vietnamising Phoenix which both 
Egger and Tilton had advocated.50 Additionally from January 1972 onwards, advisers would 
be phased out through ‘normal attrition’, in which they were not replaced once their tour 
ended.51 The deadline for most American advisers to have withdrawn from the programme 
was set as June 1972.  
The negative implications of accelerating the withdrawal of American support from 
Phoenix were evident. Neither the NP nor the PSB, despite increased recruitment, were 
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fully prepared to assume responsibility for Phoenix by mid-1972. Only 621 South 
Vietnamese case officers graduated from the Central Phung Hoang Training School 
between April and September 1971, almost 25 percent less than expected. 52  On 8 
November, province Phoenix advisers in MR III were instructed to provide a list of PSB staff 
who were considered determined and efficient. With the exception of Long Khanh, every 
documented reply listed between zero and seven individuals, illuminating the limited 
number of capable PSB personnel.53  
Despite obvious inadequacies within the PSB and NP, the United States was determined to 
accelerate Phoenix’s Vietnamisation. During a conference on 18 December for phasing 
down the programme, it was affirmed that the US government ‘wanted CORDS out of 
PHUNG HOANG’. Tilton followed this remark by stating that ‘the guidance was clear’.54 This 
desire to withdraw from the programme was also evidenced in a memorandum from Bien 
Hoa’s PSA, Clifford C. Nunn Jr., to the Deputy for CORDS in MR III. Bien Hoa was listed as 
one of the first provinces to be entirely vietnamised, but Nunn proposed that American 
advisers be retained until mid-1972 because the ‘coordination of Vietnamese activities’ 
could otherwise be jeopardised.55 The response Nunn received asserted that the ‘mission 
of any advisor is to work himself out of a job as quickly and efficiently as possible’, followed 
by the assertion that Bien Hoa displayed the ‘capability’ to maintain an effective counter-
VCI programme without advisers.56 This suggests that assessing the appearance of NP/PSB 
proficiency in operating the programme unaided was preferred over assessing their actual 
ability to do so, likely because the former option assisted in justifying the withdrawal of 
advisers.  
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The US government’s determination to accelerate Vietnamisation from mid-1971 onwards, 
in spite of the obvious potential ramifications, illustrates that jumping ship was prioritised 
over truly ensuring the GVN could direct counter-VCI activity unassisted. The question 
therefore arises, why jump ship? A key factor to note is the morality debate. Phoenix’s 
depiction in the media as a murder campaign had increasingly influenced the American 
approach towards it since 1969, as is evidenced by earlier attempts to rebrand the 
programme as being both more Vietnamese and ethical. Mounting accusations against 
Phoenix had, by mid-1971, greatly exacerbated the US government’s desire to rid itself of 
this controversy, and so withdrawal was hastened.57  One other crucial factor was the 
overall American war effort. US support for Phoenix had always been subject to the 
broader Vietnam War, and during 1971, ‘growing pressure from antiwar dissidents’, 
opposition in Congress, and the failure of Lam Son 719, drove the Nixon administration 
towards making heaving concessions to North Vietnam. 58  This weakening resolve was 
spurred by the administration’s awareness of the upcoming United States presidential 
election in November 1972, as Nixon sought to secure his second term through achieving 
a ‘speedy end to American involvement in Vietnam’.59 This undoubtedly influenced the 
pace at which American support was withdrawn from Phoenix, as not only was the 
programme controversial, it also represented one part of the much larger US commitment 
which Nixon intended to remove from Vietnam as soon as possible. Therefore, while it was 
abundantly clear that hastily withdrawing American support from Phoenix would have 
disastrous implications during 1972, ethical controversies, coupled with developments 
pertaining to the broader Vietnam War, took precedence over achieving victory in the 
village war.  
To conclude, by December 1971, the Phoenix Programme was heading for defeat in a war 
which it had been winning since 1968. The communist shadow apparatus was by this time 
a shell of its former self, having suffered for years at the hands of pacification and allied 
military supremacy. Although still operational and influential, the VCI had, across much of 
the rural countryside, lost its once-dominant position at the village level, and was now 
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struggling to collect taxes, recruit cadre or even obtain food. Phoenix had played a vital 
role in dismembering the VCI across large swaths of the rural countryside, and consistent 
improvement since its inception had by 1971 made the programme highly effective. 
However, progress over the past four years had run parallel with growing controversy, the 
impact of which was that the American government becoming decreasingly willing to 
provide support and subsequently accelerated the Vietnamisation of Phoenix. This 
hastened withdrawal of American participation was not due to ethical controversies alone, 
but equally, if not predominately, because of developments pertaining to the broader war 
effort. As America cried out for an end to the conflict which had dragged its prestige 
through the dirt, and as Nixon sought a second term in office, the entire U.S. war effort 
was consequently being withdrawn at an increasing pace. As will be illustrated throughout 
the final chapter, the Vietnamisation of the Phoenix Programme would ultimately render 
counter-VCI activity largely ineffective; thus the process of Vietnamisation and American 
withdrawal, which had in 1968/69 given Phoenix the capability to succeed, now ushered in 
its downfall.  
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Chapter Six 
The Eagle Flies Home: Counter-VCI Activity During and After 
American Departure, 1972-75 
At the onset of January 1972, the Phoenix/Phung Hoang Programme underwent the largest 
transitional phase of its history. Phoenix, referring specifically to the American side of the 
programme, was being withdrawn and closed down, while the Vietnamese aspect, Phung 
Hoang, began the process of becoming an arm of the National Police. Advisers were now 
reduced at a more significant rate than ever before, and the DGNP, renamed ‘National 
Police Command’ in March 1971, was expected to assume almost all logistical, financial, 
administrative and manpower responsibilities by year’s end. As a result of this accelerated 
American withdrawal, and the ramifications which followed, 1972 would mark the decline 
of the programme. However, counter-VCI activity did not plummet immediately following 
January, but rather continued to progress throughout the year’s opening months before 
succumbing exponentially to a myriad of factors from April/May onwards.  
Throughout the early months of 1972, Phoenix continued to demonstrate proficiency in 
waging war against the shadow apparatus. In January, the percentage of neutralised cadre 
who had functioned at the district level or higher was 26.3, a small yet noteworthy increase 
over the 1970 annual figure of 24.8.1 Effective intelligence collection and specific targeting 
in Vinh Long had brought about several key neutralisations during February, notably the 
province’s Security Section Chief.2 During March, ‘Several “Blitz” operations’ launched in 
Quang Tin Province elicited results in the form of numerous neutralisations and a drastic 
decrease in all forms of terror activity, particularly abductions, which dropped by 75 
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percent. 3 Trương Như Tảng, Minister of Justice for the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government from June 1969 until he fled the country after the fall of Saigon, stated that 
the shadow apparatus in Hau Nghia had by 1972 been ‘virtually eliminated’.4 Even if we 
assume that Tảng’s recount is exaggerated, which is likely given the common North 
Vietnamese/VC inclination towards labelling the programme as terrifying yet immoral, 
American accounts from the era confirm that the programme’s activities were at the very 
least inflicting heavy casualties upon the province’s shadow apparatus.5  
Although the programme remained impactful, and continued to progress, during early-
1972, dependence on American advisory support lingered. During 1972, PSA Bartlett 
asserted that while Hau Nghia’s centres were neutralising a high number of cadre and 
experiencing improved ‘reaction to intelligence’, he constantly had to hound his 
subordinates and Vietnamese counterparts. 6  Furthermore, progress in the province’s 
districts of Duc Hue and Trang Bang was only occurring because the advisers there were 
directing the programme entirely by themselves. 7  Moreover, the police were still not 
prepared to shoulder the burdens of total responsibility. For example, during March, the 
NP in Vinh Long were not only unwilling to assume management of the programme, but 
had also failed to even provide office supplies, which led to staff purchasing such provisions 
with American funds.8  Additionally, many centres still suffered from poor cooperation 
and/or specific targeting capabilities, and American advisers were often the only hope for 
improving or resolving these shortcomings.  
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Because American participation continued to be vital, rapidly decreasing advisory 
manpower ran parallel with decreasing effectiveness and efficiency. As Andradé astutely 
states, ‘Just as anti-infrastructure operations were taking a real toll on the VCI, American 
advisers were on their way home’.9 The necessity of American support was also evinced by 
Ahern, stating that the ‘initiative came, as usual, from the American side’.10 Conversely, 
while Prados agrees advisers were fundamental to achieving success, he argues that the 
VCI, and by extension Phoenix, became redundant once North Vietnam obtained the ability 
to ‘prosecute the conflict at the conventional level’.11 That is, as conventional warfare re-
emerged during 1972, largely due to reducing American troop numbers, and as the VCI 
were a key aspect of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam, the shadow apparatus was no 
longer crucial to the communist war effort. Prados’ argument, however, overlooks the 
important role VCI cadre played in supporting conventional warfare, as was best 
demonstrated during the Easter Offensive.  
Launched on 30 March 1972, the Easter Offensive was a nation-wide invasion of South 
Vietnam by approximately 125,000 North Vietnamese troops.12 Initially, large sections of 
the country were overrun, but communist forces began to lose momentum in May. By the 
offensive’s conclusion in October, the ARVN, decisively aided by U.S. airpower, had retaken 
much of the territory lost earlier in the year.13  The VCI had been of paramount importance 
to PAVN efforts during the offensive, providing food, shelter, resources and fresh 
recruits. 14  Furthermore, in areas where it continued to operate capably, the shadow 
apparatus was far more efficient than the GVN apparatus, and so PAVN forces could be 
better supported by local resources than the ARVN could. 15  Counter-VCI activity was 
prominent during the offensive, particularly in the old imperial capital, Hue, where during 
April, Phoenix assisted in apprehending numerous covert cadre.16 The need for a counter-
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VCI programme did not diminish after the offensive either: during October/November, 
defeated communist forces placed five-seven person teams in villages and hamlets so as 
to ‘impress that the communists are existing everywhere’.17  
The Easter Offensive demonstrated the continued importance of combating the shadow 
apparatus. However, it also highlighted the disastrous implications of American 
withdrawal. While US airpower proved decisive in staving off ARVN military catastrophe, it 
had been unable to prevent the PAVN from pouring into South Vietnam and severely 
inhibiting, if not destroying, pacification efforts throughout much of the country.18 The VCI 
re-emerged in many of these areas, as the weakened GVN position allowed for cadre to re-
enter previously hazardous villages.19 Pacification could only succeed if protected from 
enemy assaults for an extended period of time; even temporary military occupation in an 
area posed the threat of reversing years of work to establish GVN authority. Between 1969 
and early-1972, overwhelming American military forces had deterred Hanoi from launching 
large-scale conventional incursions into South Vietnam; Tet had revealed the 
consequences of such actions. However, with less than 100,000 US troops remaining by 
early-1972, North Vietnamese policy shifted once again from insurgency and guerrilla 
warfare to the main-battle approach. Thus, while the Easter Offensive was technically a 
military victory for the allies, it marked the end of an era where pacification could be 
implemented with minimal risk of interruption by conventional communist armies.  
While the offensive had been ongoing, the process of Vietnamising Phoenix/Phung Hoang 
was largely completed. On 12 April, Decree #210/TT/SL was issued, officially handing 
‘primary responsibility’ for Phung Hoang over to the National Police. 20  All 
PIOCCs/DIOCCs/CIOCCs were now merged into Police Operations Centres, although 
participating agencies would continue to staff these centres until there were sufficient 
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numbers of qualified NP officers to meet manpower requirements.21  By early-May, as 
Americans withdrew rapidly, chaos ensued within the advisory effort’s organisational 
structure, with regional headquarters struggling to keep track of the locations of advisers.22 
On 12 June, the National Police assumed financial responsibility for the programme, and in 
July, the CIA ceased funding for PRUs, which were soon after placed within the PSB.23 
By mid-1972, almost all American advisers had been withdrawn from the programme, thus 
removing the Phoenix from Phoenix/Phung Hoang. 24  Between 21 and 22 July, Colonel 
Nguyen Van Giau, Assistant National Police Commander, expressed his eagerness towards 
the National Police’s ‘new role as the responsible agency for Phung Hoang’.25 However, in 
spite of such enthusiasm, this transition had immediate and damaging consequences. 
Shortly after CIA funding was halted, PRUs were displaying a lack of concern for provincial 
and national-level authority, and their integration into the police was being stalled by 
mutual aversion between ‘PRU personnel and the uniformed police’.26 During August, GVN 
staff being transferred to POCs were in most instances untrained, substandard, and/or 
insufficient in number. 27  Furthermore, many civilian Vietnamese interpreters and 
translators working as part of Phung Hoang were on wages higher than the National Police 
could afford. Consequently, most were ‘unwilling to accept future employment with the 
National Police’. 28  Additionally, the withdrawal of advisers had already negatively 
impacted some provinces, notably Hau Nghia: On 16 September, Bartlett sent an 
exceptionally stern letter to Province Chief/Sector Commander Lieutenant-Colonel Doan 
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Cong Hau, expressing considerable unhappiness over the condition the POC’s Situation 
Section had fallen into. During this letter, Bartlett bluntly asserted that: 
‘All GVN officials should work very hard to eliminate the VCI because if we do not 
eliminate them, they will eliminate us. Yet, after two months, the situation Section 
of the Police Operations Centre has not neutralized a single enemy cadre.’29   
Although residual American advisers were aware of these issues, they lacked the authority 
they once had to impose change and effectuate improvements; as Ahern highlights, the 
‘continuing shrinkage of U.S. participation in Phung Hoang reduced American leverage 
proportionately’.30 Advisers such as Bartlett could do little more than threaten to withdraw 
any advisers remaining within their province, which would only exacerbate the situation. 
Moreover, lacking authority also prevented American officials from instigating or 
maintaining cooperation as they once had; the aforementioned PRU/NP mutual aversion 
is indicative of this. 
The American advisory effort within Phung Hoang concluded in December 1972. All 
remaining vehicles and office equipment provided by the US were handed over to the 
National Police.31 An ostensible ceasefire between all combatants of the Vietnam War 
came into effect on 28 January 1973, and the last American troops departed from South 
Vietnam in March of the same year. 32  Also during March, the American role within 
pacification concluded with the departure of CORDS.33Although some American assistance 
remained available, such as financial aid afforded to South Vietnam and a small CIA 
contingent, pacification was now essentially a Vietnamese endeavour. 34  Counter-VCI 
activity had been restricted since January, as the ceasefire came into effect, but was 
revitalised in May.35 However, from this point onwards, Phung Hoang took on a more 
covert role than it had in the past. This had also resulted from the ceasefire, as while both 
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warring sides continued to clash throughout this period of nominal peace, Phung Hoang 
remained under the radar to avoid accusations of violating the truce.36  
Documentary evidence about counter-VCI activity becomes scarce in the period after 1972, 
but available information is sufficient to highlight that VCI defeat was not achieved 
between 1973 and April 1975. The PRU continued to disregard authority during 1973, 
particularly in January when they sold the uniforms recently issued to them by the police, 
as they claimed wearing them would invite ‘VC attack’.37 By late-1973, the programme was 
still attempting to combat the VCI, while the VCI was itself attempting to rebuild and 
expand. However, the programme was by this time, as referred to by National Security 
Council Staff member William L. Stearman, a ‘low-key’ operation. 38 Furthermore, as a US 
report from 12 October reveals, efforts to combat the VCI were limited by the capabilities 
of South Vietnamese forces. That is, if security forces within a province were insufficient to 
defend pacification efforts, the province or district chief(s) would likely hesitated to 
dislodge the local communist apparatus, as such actions would invite retaliatory strikes by 
the Vietcong. 39  As the ARVN were unable to defend the entirety of South Vietnam’s 
countryside, accommodations by district or province chiefs in numerous areas would have 
undoubtedly been made for the VCI. Throughout 1974, the VC were occasionally able to 
revive their infrastructure in some locations, notably in Bac Lieu Province: during the 
second half of the year, Vietcong forces captured several GVN outposts within the 
province, triggering a surge in support for the shadow government throughout local 
villages and hamlets. This boost in support was immediately used to increase recruitment, 
revealing the speed at which the VCI could re-establish control in an area where GVN 
authority was enfeebled.40  
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Although the shadow government did not recover in most parts of South Vietnam between 
1973 and 1974, and actually declined in many instances as a result of GVN regular and local 
forces, pacification and counter-VCI activity failed to deliver a knockout blow.41 This was 
because such a blow required complete destabilisation of the shadow infrastructure, a task 
the GVN were unable to achieve before their ultimate downfall. As is revealed by the 
programme’s decline during mid/late-1972 as a result of American withdrawal, the 
progress of counter-VCI activity from 1973 onwards was at best impaired, if not reversed. 
Had pacification and counter-VCI activities damaged the shadow apparatus more rapidly 
during the last two years of the GVN’s existence, and had more time been available to 
implement pacification before the nation’s abrupt end, perhaps the village war could have 
been won. However, such increases in available time and programme efficiency would only 
have occurred if American military forces and support for Phung Hoang had been 
withdrawn later than they were. Therefore, Phoenix/Phung Hoang’s failure to defeat the 
VCI can be attributed both to the programme’s inherent flaw of dependence on American 
support, and developments pertaining to the broader Vietnam War which ensured 
American participation was withdrawn prior to the village war being won. Such 
developments included the United States’ increasing desire to depart from Vietnam, anti-
war demonstrations, Operation Lam Son 719, opposition in Congress, and Nixon’s 
determination to win a second term in office.  
Between December 1974 and April 1975, Hanoi launched its final, decisive offensives 
against South Vietnam. Beginning with Phuoc Long in December, PAVN forces soon spread 
across the entire country, conquering city after city. The United States, entrenched in 
internal political debates and reeling from the Watergate scandal, was unwilling to re-enter 
the infamous quagmire. The ARVN, overstretched, undersupplied, and no longer supported 
by American troops or airpower, crumbled at the hands of superior communist forces. By 
27 April, the PAVN were at the gates of Saigon, with the city’s defenders ill-prepared, 
outgunned and outmanned.42 The rapidity of North Vietnamese victory in 1975 had done 
that which neither Tet nor the Easter Offensive had, rendered counter-VCI activity 
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redundant. With entire sections of South Vietnam falling in mere weeks, the communist 
infrastructure, and by extension counter-VCI activity, were less strategically valuable than 
in previous and more indecisive offensives. This reveals that even had village war been 
won, this was only one aspect of ensuring South Vietnam’s survival, as the ARVN would 
need to be capable of withstanding Northern assaults for long enough that the invading 
forces were required to draw upon local resources, which would have been more difficult 
to acquire without the VCI. The history of the Phung Hoang Programme came to its 
conclusion on 30 April, the day Saigon fell to Hanoi. 
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Conclusion 
In order to accurately evaluate the successes and limitations of the Phoenix/Phung Hoang 
Programme, one must consider the objectives and goals envisioned during its inception. As 
an integral component of the security side of pacification, the programme was established 
with the primary charge of dismantling the communist shadow apparatus. To achieve this, 
its objectives centred on orchestrating a more concerted, efficient and capable attack 
against the VCI than had previously existed. These objectives consisted of instigating 
cooperation and coordination between participants, expanding intelligence and 
operational capabilities, improving the motivation and morale of personnel, and 
implementing universal regulations, strategies and procedures. Therefore, the 
programme’s success must be measured through its impact on the development of 
counter-VCI activity, and its effectiveness against the shadow government. 
Substantial advancements in the development of counter-VCI activity were made between 
1968 and 1971. Although progress was initially stagnant, with neither Vietnamese nor 
American officials placing much emphasis on the ‘other war’, the Tet Offensive’s political 
aftermath resulted in a rapid increase in the manpower and resources available to Phoenix, 
thereby accelerating the pace of progress. The introduction of training schools in 1968-69 
marked the beginning of a process to increase the quality of Vietnamese and American 
personnel, which had by the early 1970s elicited a more competent intelligence and 
operations community. Amendments to the an tri system had resulted in the 
establishment of basic operating procedures, as well as increased reporting accuracy and 
sentencing speeds. The establishment of DIOCCs and PIOCCS across South Vietnam, in 
culmination with the rapports built between American advisers and GVN officials, 
significantly improved cooperation and coordination between Vietnamese agencies. 
Increased cooperation where little had previously existed, in addition to the organisational 
structure of DIOCCs/PIOCCs, greatly streamlined intelligence collection, collation and 
dissemination. By attaching Provincial Recognisance Units to Phoenix centres and honing 
their skills and training towards counter-VCI activity, an already effective force became 
truly devastating. Even less capable reaction units, such as the National Police Field Force, 
progressed to become a viable option during many operations. Success in these areas was 
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best illustrated through the rise of specific targeting. That is, between 1967 and 1971, the 
strategy’s implementation transitioned from being largely unviable to occurring 
frequently, due to the gradual rise in quality and efficiency of programme personnel and 
participating agencies.  
There are a number of methods for measuring the programme’s effectiveness against the 
VCI. One such method is neutralisation data, as 81,740 cadre were reportedly neutralised 
between 1968 and 1972. This could be argued as indicative of success. However, 
neutralisation statistics were inaccurate, with both underestimations and overestimations 
undermining the reliability of these figures. Furthermore, it is difficult to identify the 
proportion of neutralisations attributable to Phoenix.  There are, however, more reliable 
methods of assessment. Through looking at the attention which Hanoi and the VC paid to 
Phoenix, it becomes clear that the programme was considered a major threat: radio 
broadcasts denouncing Phoenix, the creation of clandestine forces to counter its activities, 
and assassination attempts against GVN officials involved in the programme, were all 
illustrative of the North and VC’s concern.  
The extent to which Phoenix damaged the VCI is also revealed through the North 
Vietnamese and VC sources presented during this thesis, notably the second congress of 
South Vietnam’s communist party, captured documents, and statements by cadre and 
communist officials. These sources highlighted that the programme was highly effective, 
with the shadow government in many parts of the country either severely impaired or 
completely decimated. Additionally, individual VCI reports illuminate that cadre morale 
had been weakened by the programme’s activities and proficiency. Source material from 
the American side offers a similar perspective, illustrating that the programme gradually 
became more effective, particularly during 1970-71. In 1970, most officials, notably Egger, 
saw the Cambodian Campaign as having demonstrated the programme’s capabilities given 
the correct environment and circumstances. This is largely accurate, as the combined 
actions of Phoenix and allied military forces devastated the apparatus in many of the 
provinces bordering Cambodia. The damage inflicted upon the VCI increased during 1971, 
as was shown through reduced communist taxation, declining cadre manpower, and the 
COSVN’s efforts to conceal its activities. While the programme’s success against the higher 
echelons was limited, the neutralisation of numerous low-level cadre and sufficient 
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numbers of mid-level cadre destabilised the shadow government’s command structure, 
impairing the higher echelon’s ability to project authority at the village and hamlet level.  
Therefore, contrary to the assertions of Valentine and McCoy, the Phoenix Programme was 
by 1971 very effective, having destabilised the infrastructure in many parts of the country 
and inflicted heavy casualties on cadre manpower. Although Prados contends that 
Phoenix’s failure to neutralise many high-level cadre is indicative of poor performance, not 
only were cadre at higher echelons inherently fewer in number, but the damage inflicted 
at the lower and middle echelons prevented the flow of high-level direction and authority. 
Mark Moyar’s argument that the programme is owed little credit for the shadow 
government’s impairment during the late-1960s and early-1970s is unsubstantiated. Many 
of the achievements of counter-VCI units and territorial forces stemmed from training and 
increased personnel quality resulting from Phoenix’s efforts to strengthen these assets.  
While it is clear that Phoenix displayed consistent growth in efficiency and effectiveness 
between 1968 and 1972, there were limitations. Improvements to the an tri system failed 
to entirely resolve many of its shortcomings. Leniency and negligence continued to be 
prominent. Processing and sentencing speeds were still slow in some parts of the country. 
Furthermore, in many instances, sentencing guidelines were not adhered to, and so 
numerous VCI received sentences shorter than the prescribed length. Specific targeting 
was used in every province by 1972, but varied from area to area in how regularly it was 
employed. In Phoenix centres where specific targeting was only taking place on some 
occasions, such as Hau Nghia, this was generally due to a lack of qualified staff and an 
insufficient intelligence collection. Cooperation remained poor in some areas of the 
country, particularly between military and police personnel, which hindered intelligence 
sharing and the viability of joint operations. The establishment of training schools provided 
the programme with skilled staff and advisers, but in 1971 far fewer case officers graduated 
than expected, which was made more problematic by the increased need for officers as 
Americans withdrew from the programme. Finally, the National Police’s assumption of 
authority over Phoenix centres was lethargic, particularly at the district level, with this 
process still incomplete by 1972. Consequently, competition between military and police 
officials persisted in those centres not yet under NP direction. While the foregoing 
examples highlight that there were limitations to the programme’s successes, Phoenix’s 
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history demonstrates that issues could be resolved given enough time and attention. Had 
American participation continued for longer, it is likely that additional ameliorations would 
have occurred. 
Another key aspect in any assessment of Phoenix is the morality debate. Allegations against 
the programme were often exaggerated or unsupported by tangible evidence. While acts 
of corruption, torture, assassination and mass arrests occurred, they were neither as 
common as some scholars and American officials have stated, nor were they approved by 
leading authorities within South Vietnam, the United States or the Phoenix directorate. To 
the contrary, these authorities placed considerable emphasis on reducing unethical acts, 
not only as means to improve efficiency, but also to prevent controversies from arising. 
Contrary to Valentine’s argument, Phoenix was neither envisioned to be, nor ever was, a 
terror campaign tasked with inciting fear. Rather the programme functioned as part of the 
larger pacification effort, which aimed to win the hearts and minds of the peasantry, not 
through terror but by offering wealth, security and political stability. Moreover, despite 
McCoy’s contentions, the programme meets very few of the criteria for a murder 
campaign, as non-lethal neutralisations were preferred to, and more common than, lethal 
neutralisations. Phoenix’s hearings were fuelled by false evidence and claims, such as those 
presented by Kenneth Barton Osborn. As Andradé, Moyar and Degroot have highlighted, 
the allegations specifically against Phoenix were less the result of actual moral violations, 
which occurred to some extent across every facet of the Vietnam War, than they were the 
result of the programme’s ostensibly symbolic title. Furthermore, although units such as 
the PRU also drew controversy, the programme’s name gave rise to negative connotations 
which American media outlets and politicians latched onto. 
By assessing the source material and scholarly debates surrounding this subject, one can 
establish that the Phoenix Programme was an effective and capable force through which a 
genuinely devastating campaign against the communist shadow apparatus was mounted. 
Furthermore, ethical violations committed by Phoenix personnel and its participating 
agencies were at worst similar to those perpetrated in every other aspect of the Vietnam 
War, and in most instances measures were taken to curb or reduce the frequency of 
immoral acts within the programme. Nevertheless, while Phoenix achieved many 
successes, it ultimately failed in its foremost task of dismantling the VCI. This failure did not 
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stem from ineffectiveness or a lack of progress. Rather, it can be attributed both to 
dependence on American participation, a flaw which was never resolved, and the external 
factors which ensured that American participation in Phoenix and the wider conflict would 
be withdrawn before the village war could be won.  
Dependence on American participation persisted throughout Phoenix’s history, and much 
of the programme’s progress was owed to American involvement. Rapports between 
American advisers and GVN officials were frequently the only thing maintaining the fragile 
cooperation built between participating Vietnamese agencies, and advisory pressure aided 
greatly in boosting personnel motivation. Advisers also offered much needed expertise in 
intelligence collection, operational procedures, reaction-force tactics, and administrative 
organisation. Furthermore these advisers often directed Phoenix’s activities themselves, 
and had in some instances become the de-facto leaders of the DIOCC or PIOCC they were 
assigned to. In addition to advisory support, American funding was imperative. The drastic 
rise in financial support afforded to Phoenix following the Tet Offensive had allowed the 
programme to expand rapidly, notably in terms of facilities, reward programmes and 
manpower. Between 1967 and mid-1972, the bulk of Phoenix/Phung Hoang’s financial 
requirements were met by the United States, as the South Vietnamese government was 
incapable of bearing such costs. This financial dependence had not ceased by June 1972, 
and GVN sources, specifically the National Police, lacked the capacity to provide the same 
level of funding which had been available under American sponsorship. The US was equally 
vital at the national level, with individuals such as Komer and Colby having influenced the 
programme greatly and pushed the GVN to participate fully. One example of this influence 
was Colby’s input in the formation of annual pacification plans between 1968 and 1971. 
American support also came in the form of resources, such as vehicles and building 
materials. 
Because Phoenix functioned as part of the village war, which was itself one facet in a much 
wider conflict, support for the programme depended on the circumstances of the United 
States’ commitment to the Vietnam War as a whole. The backing afforded to Phoenix had 
been minimal in 1967 for this reason, as officials such as Westmoreland focused primarily 
on the military side of the conflict. The nature of America’s commitment altered greatly in 
1968, with the Tet Offensive’s aftermath shifting US policy towards de-escalation and 
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gradual withdrawal. This shift initially favoured Phoenix, as the programme’s potential as 
a means to expand GVN authority and improve rural security, and by extension justify 
American troop withdrawals, made it a valuable asset. Subsequently, American 
involvement in the programme increased drastically, particularly following Nixon’s 
entrance into the White House. Thereafter, counter-VCI activity became a tool of 
Vietnamisation. However, the long term implications of this policy shift proved disastrous, 
as the introduction of de-escalation, withdrawal and Vietnamisation set in motion a 
process which eventually saw American participation torn from the programme, leaving 
behind a weakened and stagnant Phung Hoang. Because the American effort in Vietnam 
as whole was from 1968 onwards geared towards eventual departure, there was only 
limited time available before support for Phoenix would face the chopping block. Between 
1969 and early-1971, the gradual Vietnamisation of Phoenix had few negative effects, 
except for some small reductions in some manpower and funding. However, this process 
was greatly accelerated during late-1971.  
This acceleration stemmed from a number of factors. One was the political situation within 
the United States. As the Vietnam War progressed, pressure from the American domestic 
front mounted, with anti-war demonstrations demanding an end to US involvement in the 
conflict. The rising tide of anti-war sentiment placed considerable strain on the Nixon 
administration, which had come into office on the back of a promise to end America’s 
involvement in the war. This was further exacerbated by the 1972 presidential election, as 
Nixon sought a hastened end to the Vietnam War, or at least to America’s role in it, in order 
to appease protesters and ensure a second term in office. Another factor was the improved 
security situation in South Vietnam by 1971. During this period, VC/PAVN forces were on 
the back foot, and the decreasing scale of military engagements, as well as declining 
communist presence at the village level, sufficed to justify an accelerated American 
withdrawal. Finally, the controversy surrounding Phoenix, although largely unfounded, 
weakened US resolve to the extent that withdrawal from the programme was prioritised 
over achieving victory in the village war. Accusations hurled against the programme’s 
activities, in conjunction with the already substantial discontent held by large sections of 
the American public towards the overall war effort, were decisive in accelerating 
Vietnamisation within Phoenix. As counter-VCI activity grew increasingly controversial in 
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the US, it added further fuel to the anti-war movement. Consequently, the United States 
government sought to distance itself from Phoenix. 
Between late-1971 and early-1973, the American role within counter-VCI activity was 
hastily withdrawn. By late-1972, the removal of American advisers, funding, logistical 
support, resources and national-level guidance had severely impaired the programme’s 
effectiveness and capabilities. Efficiency plummeted, cooperation withered, and the 
National Police buckled under enormous financial burdens. The withdrawal of American 
troops also negatively impacted Phoenix, as once again pacification efforts were exposed 
to large-scale communist assaults. Therefore, the events of 1972 demonstrated that South 
Vietnam, alone, could not maintain the level of success achieved by Phoenix during the era 
of American participation. The Phoenix could not fly without an Eagle’s wings. The 
programme’s history after 1972 remains for the most part a mystery, yet it is clear that 
counter-VCI activity declined in prominence and, crucially, failed to defeat the VCI; thus the 
village war was never won. While it is impossible to identify whether the programme would 
have defeated the shadow apparatus if the United States had not pulled out from 
pacification as early as it did, it can be firmly asserted that the prospect of victory would 
have improved had the US continued its support for a longer period of time.  
Overall, the Phoenix/Phung Hoang Programme was highly effective, having devastated 
communist authority throughout large sections of South Vietnam. Nevertheless, it 
ultimately failed to defeat the shadow apparatus. The programme constituted a 
revolutionary approach in counter-VCI activity, as no comparable effort had previously 
been made on a nationwide scale to unify the agencies and programmes engaged in this 
struggle. During the short period of substantial American support, between late-1968 and 
late-1971, Phoenix progressed gradually into a highly proficient structure, ensuring that 
counter-VCI activity was improved, augmented and coordinated to the extent that 
communist cadre at the lower and middle echelons suffered greatly. However, an inherent 
flaw existed at the heart of the programme: dependence on American support limited the 
window of opportunity available for Phoenix to achieve its primary goal, and subsequently 
the VCI was never entirely dismantled. Defeating the apparatus would undoubtedly have 
required the United States to provide considerable resources to the programme for longer 
than it did. Disinterest in the village war prior to 1968, and the drive to disengage from 
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Vietnam following the Tet Offensive, precluded such participation from beginning earlier 
or concluding later. Nevertheless, even had the United States and GVN succeeded in the 
village war, this alone would not have altered the course of South Vietnam’s history, as the 
nation’s downfall ultimately came about as a result of its inability to stand militarily without 
American troops or airpower. South Vietnam’s survival required victory in both the political 
and military side of the war, neither of which were achieved. Phoenix, alone, could not 
have prevented the fall of Saigon.   
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